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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the reemerging "Baltic Question" and
its implications for European security. Relatively neglected
for decades, the issue dramatically recaptured international
attention on 11 March 1990, when Lithuania declared its
independence from the Soviet Union, and then gained momentum
from the subsequent moves toward secession by Estonia and
Latvia. This thesis argues that the security of Europe and
stability of the Baltic states are closely intertwined and
that, .therefore, this drive for independence demands careful
attention by those who are constructing a post-Cold War
security paradigm for Europe. To show that the three states
are an important component in the European security equation,
the thesis examines both the historical (12th-20th Centuries)
connection, and that of the post-World War II era. With this
discussion as background, it investigates alternate courses
that the future might take, and assesses the effect each would
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the dramatic and historic changes which
took place in Eastern Europe in 1989-90, an unprecedented
event occurred in the Soviet Union--on 11 March 1990,
Lithuania became the first Union republic ever to declare
independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR). The Kremlin's reaction to this declaration was swift
and negative, despite Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's
announcement two months earlier that secession might indeed
be possible. Moscow had tolerated, even encouraged, changes
in the status quo when they occurred in Warsaw Pact countries,
but now balked as they affected Soviet territory. Lithuania
refused to back down, so Gorbachev attempted to isolate it
(and intimidate other republics) by exerting diplomatic and
economic pressure. Undeterred by such blatant arm-twisting,
however, Estonia and Latvia demonstrated solidarity with their
southern neighbor by resurrecting the 1934 Baltic Council and
embarking on their own paths to independence.
These events marked the resurfacing of the "Baltic
Question," an issue that has simmered unresolved since the
1940 annexation of the three Baltic countries by the Soviet
Union. That action, as this thesis shows, violated the letter
and spirit of numerous treaties and principles: the 1918
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1920 treaties between Russia and all
1
three states, t.e 1926 Treaty of Friendship with Lithuania
(renewed in 1931), the 1932 Non-Aggression Pacts with Latvia
and Eatonia, and the 1939 Defense and Mutual Assistance Pacts
with all three. Further, Soviet incorporation of the
independent Baltic countries was a flagrant violation of the
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact,I and of the principles set forth in
the charter of the League of Nations (all four countries were
members). The United States and most other nations criticized
Moscow and refused to recognize the annexation. Still, they
refrained from harsh diplomatic, economic, or military action
to liberate the "captive nations," thus giving birth to the
Baltic Question. Were the Baltic states sold out? Why was
this action allowed to stand? Can it be remedied 50 years
later? Should it be? Such questions, long-repressed, once
again are demanding attention, in the wake of Lithuania's 11
March 1990 declaration and subsequent Estonian and Latvian
secessionist activities.
The Baltic Question is reemerging at a time when the
international community is commencing a post-Cold War
restructuring. In the wake of sharply changed bipolar
relations, allies and former adversaries now are attempting
to create a new security paradigm for Europe. The would-be
1Signatories to the Pact renounced aggression, and declared
war to be an acceptable instrument of national policy only in cases
of self-defense. The Soviet Union (February 1929) and 62 other
nations eventually ratified it. See: Great Soviet Encyclopedia 12,
(New York: MacMillan, Inc., 1973), 398.
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architects of this paradigm are studying many options, such
as using the Conference on Security and Cooperetion in Europe
(CSCE) or European Community (EC) as the basis for an all-
new security system, or building upon existing structures,
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They
intend to ensure that their framework offers the most rational
and stable structure possible. Depending upon one's point of
view, the reemergence of the Baltic Question at this time
either comes at a most propitious time, or it complicates an
already complex job.
To create an effective and equitable system, planners will
need to balance recdonal and national interests, each of which
involve a broad range of often conflicting economic,
political, cultural, and military factors. At the regional,
or European level, the ultimate concern is to provide
stability and security, two concepts which are very much
intertwined. Thus, it becomes important to determine whether
the Baltic drive for freedom--successful or not--will
contribute to, or detract from, regional stability. One must
realize that the Baltic states' status as sovereign or
dominated nations has been influencing European stability for
over six centuries. As this thesis shows, they have been the
victims of international politics, for much of that time.
Stronger, more aggressive powers have been attracted to their
access to the sea, their harbors and productive lands, and
their industrious people. However, Estonia, Latvia, and
3
Lithuania have been unable to defend themselves or obtain
sufficient backing from the Great Powers. This has created
periodic power vacuums, which have provided even greater
temptation for the aggressive powers to invade. This
instability, in turn, has affected the European security
environment in much the same way (though perhaps less
dramatically) that the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has sent
waves of uncertainty tk'_ugh the Middle East. Thus, the three
states have been, and continue to be, an important component
in the overall European security equation. Because this will
continue to hold true in the future as well, it is essential
to understand how their current actions or their reemergence
as sovereign states might affect the evolving balance of
power.
Regional security paradigms are more than the sum of
national interests, but national interests are also important
to consider. Europe can never be truly secure until major
disputes are resolved and each nation-state in the region
feels secure. Therefore, it is important for strategists to
weigh not only the wants and needs of the overall
international community, but also the requirements of the
individual Baltic states and their neighbors, including the
Soviet Union. The Balts, for example, have claims which
legitimately demand attention. Though not a party to any
aggression and though declared neutrals at the outset of World
War II, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania emerged from the
4
conflict as the only countries to lose complete sovereignty.
Even the primary aggressor of the war, Germany, soon regained
partial sovereignty, and is now totally sovereign. There are
many who would argue that this situation morally cannot be
ignored while other European wrongs are being righted.
On the other hand, Soviet defense strategists view the
Baltic republics as crucial to security of the USSR, whether
they remain part of the Union or ultimately regain their
independence. Therefore, Soviet interests must be addressed.
Similarly, each of the neighboring states in the region must
feel assured that its interests are not jeopardized, either
by instability caused by restive, frustrated Balts, or by any
power vacuum arising from the reemergence of unguaranteed,
weakly-defended independent countries.
The final settlement signed at the "two plus four" talks
and subsequent political unification of the German Democratic
Republic and Federal Republic of Germany have left many with
the impression that, after 45 years, the war is finally over.
In reality, however, what the two events did was to resolve
the domestic part of the German Question. This thesis
contends that World War I cannot be considered truly ended
as long as the Baltic Question remains unanswered. In fact,
much of the western boundary of the USSR still requires
clarification. Policy makers and planners of the future order
must be sensitive to this, in order to make more informed
judgments while formulating new, forward-looking strategies.
5
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to that search
for new strategies, by offering a timely analysis of the
Baltic Question. It argues that stability and security of the
three Baltic states has affected European security--from the
12th Century to the present--and examines the implications of
modern Baltic secessionist efforts. After examining
historical precedent as background to the present
circumstances, it considers what alternative courses might be
in store for the future and assesses the effect each would
have. Change in Baltic sovereignty is not necessarily
unmanageable, undesirable, or inherently destabilizing,
despite historical precedents which may suggest so.
Methodologically, this thesis employs a chronological,
empirical approach that makes substantial use of the measured
judgments of experts on the region, and incorporates two
levels of analysis--nation-states and regional systems.2
Considering other levels might contribute to an even better
understanding, but would produce an unwieldy document.
Additionally, this thesis concentrates on political and
physical security issues, though it is clear that cultural
2Singer has observed that different levels of analysis (e.g.,
individuals, bureaucratic structures, global systems, etc.) provide
different perspectives on why states and systems act the way they
do. Each contributes in its own way to a better understanding, and
levels are selected according to each study's needs. See: J. David
Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,"
in The International System: Theoretical Essays, ed. Klaus Knorr
and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 77-
94.
6
and economic variables are also deeply intertwined in the
overall matter of European security.
Organizationally, this thesis is divided into four major
blocks of investigation. Chapter II establishes the
historical legacy, by considering how events in Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania have affected European stability and
security from the 12th Century through 1940. As is shown,
this legacy does not make a very encouraging case for the
coexistence of Baltic independence and European stability.
This chapter should also correct the widespread misperception
that the three republics are a single, homogeneous entity, and
it should demonstrate important traditional political and
cultural links between the Baltic states and their neighbors.
Annexed by Stalin as a result of secret protocols to the
1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Baltic states were quickly
and thoroughly integrated into the Soviet Union's national
security plan. Chapter III demonstrates what this development
meant for the Baltic states and for European security over the
next fifty years. Further, it attempts to assess the actual
value of the three republics for Soviet security--can Moscow
afford to lose them? The answer to this question shapes, to
a considerable degree, how viable certain alternative futures
are.
Chapter IV examines the reactions of selected governments
to current Baltic efforts to secede from the USSR. This
chapter is important for understanding whether or not the
7
prospects of Baltic freedom make neighboring countries fearful
for their own national interests. Although the international
community has adopted a generally cautious approach, this
chapter argues that it is possible to discern the foundations
of the next generation of economic, cultural, and possibly
security institutions.
With this discussion as background, and with the full
understanding that history guides but does not predetermine
the future, Chapter V offers an analysis of alternative
courses the future might follow--remaining in the USSR, non-
alignment, neutrality, and alignment--and the implications of
each. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to
design a new, overarching security plan for Europe.
Therefore, the options considered here generally conform to
existing frameworks.
Although the contributions of independent Baltic states
to European collective security may have been destabilizing
in the past, there is good reason to believe that the future
can be much more positive. Many of the factors which lured
aggressive powers to the Baltic region in the past continue
to be valid, but others are no longer. For example, it is
difficult to imagine that the Nordic countries, Poland, or
Germany have any designs on the region. Less certain is the
USSR, but this thesis argues that, if Moscow is willing, the
Baltic Question can be resolved in ways which can add to,
rather than detract from, regional security. Even if Moscow
8
is not willing,3 though, present conditions demand that
strategic planners take another hard look at the Baltic
situation. Baltic governments are accelerating their drive
toward secession, and any such changes carry the potential for
unrest and conflict. Therefore, whether or not the three
states regain their independence, it is imperative to begin
thinking now about the extent of Baltic influence on European
security, and about what niche they should occupy in any
future security order.
3Soviet leaders are concerned about more than just security
from external military threats. They also must consider other
factors, such as economics and prestige, as well as the very real
danger that Baltic secession might set off a "domino effect" which
could unravel the Union.
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II. PAST: HISTORICAL PLACE IN THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK
A. THE EARLY YEARS
Near the end of the 12th Century, outsiders began invading
the backwater area of Europe which now makes up Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania. Teutonic Knights, who were suffering
set-backs in their Mediterranean crusades, found that the path
of least resistance led, instead, to the pagan north.4 The
Danes followed suit by establishing their own presence in
northern Estonia at the turn of the century. Thus, before
they could develop indigenous political or defense systems on
anything larger than a tribal scale, Estonia and what is now
Latvia were assimilated into Western Christendom. Although
they were able to preserve elements of their ethnic character,
residents of the area soon adopted many European social and
cultural habits. The Danes divested their interests in 1346,
leaving the region largely under the domination of the
Teutonic Order.
Lithuanians, on the other hand, successfully resisted
advances by outsiders, largely as a result of the efforts of
4For an informative discussion of this early history, see: V.
Stanley Vardys and Romuald J. Misiunas, "The Baltic Peoples in
Historical Perspective," in The Baltic States in Peace and War, ed.
Vardys and Misiunas (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University, 1978), 1-16. Additional insights may be found in Georg
von Rauch, The Baltic States: The Years of Independence (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1970).
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Mindaugas, a local chieftain. Between 1240-63, he forged a
political entity out of tribes in Lithuania and parts of what
is now Belorussia. He and his successors turned Lithuania
into a major power that steadily expanded its borders eastward
into the Duchy of Muscovy. After years of persistent, heavy
pressure from the Teutonic Order, however, Lithuania looked
to Poland for support. Polish backing was secured by dynastic
marriage in 1386, but only after the Lithuanian ruler agreed
to convert his subjects to Catholicism.5  The loose, ill-
defined union of the two countries that resulted, stretched
from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and from Poland to near
Moscow. Through this association, Lithuanians--particularly
the nobility--became politically and culturally Polonized.
By the 1500s, the Teutonic Order had grown weaker and
Sweden, newly-independent and competing against Danish
hegemony, began expanding its reach southward across Estonia.
In 1557, Tsar Ivan IV launched the Livonian War (1557-82),
hoping to gain Russian access to the Baltic Sea. In fear and
seeking protection against the Russians, Livonia (present-
day southern Estonia and eastern Latvia) allowed much of its
territory to be incorporated by Lithuania. As the Russian
threat grew stronger, Lithuania signed the 1569 Union of
Lublin, which transformed its two hundred year old personal
5Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States:
Years of Dependence 1940-1980 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983), 2-3.
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union with Poland into a formal commonwealth. The Russians
pressed westward, but eventually were pushed out of Estonia
and Livonia by Swedish forces. Lithuania also repelled the
Russians, and gained territory in Livonia and Courland (now
western Latvia). However, Lithuanian's forces were unable to
push the Swedes out of the Baltic area.
Russia again attempted to expand westward when Peter I
launched the Great Northern War (1700-21) against Sweden.
This time the Tsar's reorganized and greater forces prevailed,
and Sweden ceded Estonia and Latvia to Russia by the Treaty
of Nystad (1721). Meanwhile, the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth showed signs of internal decay, so it too became
an inviting target for Russian attentions. By the three
partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, Lithuania
eventually joined Estonia and Latvia as possessions of the
Tsar.
Although the three Baltic states had political, social,
cultural structures that were different from each other and
quite distinct again from rest of Russia, a sense of
fellowship evolved from sharing a common fate. That feeling
increased as the Tsar implemented programs designed to
integrate them into the burgeoning Russian empire. These
"Russification" policies began in earnest in Lithuania after
its 1830-31 revolt against cultural and political oppression,
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and were in full swing in Estonia and Latvia by the 1860s.6
The results were resentment and a simmering nationalism, which
broke into open unrest, disorder, and anti-Russian sentiment
by 1905.
That instability notwithstanding, the region became
progressively more important for Russian trade and security.
As the Tsar's railroad network was expanded into the area,
Riga, Liepaja (Libau), and Tallinn (Reval) became critical
commercial ports and industrial centers. Further, the St.
Petersburg-based Russian Fleet found it advantageous to
establish naval ports and facilities along the entire east
coast of the Baltic Sea. Because of its geographic location,
Estonia was viewed as having particular strategic importance,
for it forms the southern boundary of the Gulf of Finland--
a narrow waterway through which Russian naval vessels had to
pass when transiting between the Baltic Sea and facilities in
St. Petersburg (Leningrad).
B. TRANSITORY FREEDOM (1918-40)
During the course of World War I, German troops overran
Russian defenses and occupied a significant portion of the
Baltic countries. However, the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
and a near-simultaneous collapse of both the Russian and
German empires ended this presence, and allowed Lithuania (16
6Rauch, 8.
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February 1918), Estonia (24 February 1918), and Latvia (18
November 1919)--as well as the Ukraine, Georgia,
Transcaucasia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia--to declare their
independence. Freedom for latter was short-lived, though, for
the new Bolshevik government soon moved in to reclaim the
former Tsarist holdings. However, hastily-established
militias and outside assistance, primarily British in Estonia
and German in Latvia, permitted the three Baltic states to
avoid being reabsorbed.
Upon Lithuania's declaration of independence, Poland began
pressuring it to restore their former union. Lithuania
demurred, and territorial disputes soon erupted between the
two, including Polish occupation of Vilnius.7 As a result,
relations grew strained, and the two sides did not establish
diplomatic relations until 1938.
Moscow finally abandoned its efforts to recover the three
Baltic states, and signed treaties in 1920 which renounced all
claims to their territories in perpetuity.8 It followed these
treaties with non-aggression or neutrality agreements with
each: Lithuania in 1926 (renewed in 1931), Latvia in 1932,
and Estonia in 1932.
7Vilnius, the historical capital of Lithuania, had been
returned to Lithuania by the Allied powers in December 1919. This
Polish occupation occurred in October 1920, and caused the
government to relocate to Kaunas.
8vardys and Misiunas, 10.
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With matters seemingly resolved between them and their
eastern neighbor, the independent Baltic countries began their
quest for a place in Europe. They pursued a path of
neutrality, partly because they felt it inadvisable to
antagonize any of the nearby large powers, and partly because
they were unable to interest their neighbors in any type of
federation. Continuing differences between Poland and
Lithuania made Poland an unlikely partner, and Finland's lack
of interest in any southern alliance prevented a northward-
stretching collective security arrangement.9 The three joined
the League of Nations in 1922, hoping it would be an effective
vehicle for resolving conflicting interests of the Great
Powers, while protecting the interests of smaller and weaker
nations. These hopes ultimately proved to be misplaced.
Unable to raise regional interest in a collective security
plan, and cognizant of the fact that tensions were rising all
across Europe, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania finally banded
together in 1934 to create the Baltic Entente. This pact
provided for common action in defense and foreign affairs.
However, there was disagreement within the Entente over the
nature of the threat to be countered. Lithuania and Latvia
were most concerned by a looming German threat, while Estonia
9Misiunas and Taagepera, 13. In 1935, Finland had a change ofheart and ineffectively attempted to form a bloc of Scandinavian
and Baltic states to act as a balance between Germany and Russia.
See: William L. Langer, An EncvcloDedia of World History (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980), 1045.
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worried about the Soviet Union. Despite their professed
intentions, the Baltic states allowed petty differences and
bickering to prevent them from seriously coordinating their
efforts until it was too late. At the same time, their
neutrality came under criticism by both the Soviet Union and
Great Britain, who wanted the Baltic countries to participate
in a collective defense against Germany.'
0
So, on the eve of World War II, there were competing Great
Power interests over the Baltic region. Because the three
Baltic countries were unable to defend their neutral status
effectively, their security depended upon a delicate--and
ultimately untenable--balancing of the interests and appetites
of many large and powerful neighbors. For its part, the
Soviet Union was anxious to recover territories it had lost
after World War I, and it saw great strategic benefits in
possessing the Baltic states as a buffer against any potential
German invasion. France and Great Britain also worried about
the possibility of German expansion, but were unwilling to
guarantee Baltic independence to counter that threat.
Instead, they ineffectively argued for a regional solution.
The two were preparing to offer the Soviets free reign in the
area, but were preempted by 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact.
11
10 isiunas and Taagepera, 14.
11Boris Meissner, "The Baltic Question in World Politics," in
The Baltic States in Peace and War, ed. V.S. Vardys and R.J.
Misiunas (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1978),
140-141.
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Poland, too, had visions of restoring its historic union
with Lithuania, and hoped to organize the three Baltic
countries under its leadership to stand as a buffer between
the Soviet Union and Germany. France encouraged creation of
such a regional alliance, maintaining it should also include
Finland. However, the concept failed to reach fruition,
largely because of Polish arrogance and continued occupation
of Vilnius, but also because of the lack of a French or
British guarantee.12  Additionally, the Soviet Union and
Germany--for reasons that became obvious after 1939--were
opposed to any alliance between Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania.
Finally, there were the interests of an ambitious Germany,
which viewed the Baltic countries as important trade partners;
in the late 1930s, Berlin signed agreements to take 70 percent
of all Baltic exports.13 Further, Hitler had aspirations of
annexing and Germanizing the Baltics, goals he revealed in
Mein Kampf and in conversations with foreign leaders.
C. STOLEN INDEPENDENCE
As the 1930s drew to a close, Germany's actions became
increasingly provocative toward the Baltic states. First, it
12Edgar Anderson, "The Baltic Entente: Phantom or Reality?" in
The Baltic States in Peace and War, ed. V.S. Vardys and R.J.
Misiunas (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1978),
127.
1 Rauch, 218.
took control of Klaipeda (Memel) in March 1939, after local
elections gave 90 percent of the vote to National Socialists.
Klaipeda, a predominately German city, was under Allied
control after World War I and had been awarded to Lithuania
after it engineered an insurrection there in 1923. Now,
German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop told Lithuania that if it
did not surrender the area voluntarily, the German army might
take it forcibly.14  In view of Germany's invasion of
Czechoslovakia a week earlier, this was viewed as no idle
threat. Lithuania complied and, in return, Germany
"guaranteed" Lithuanian independence, and concluded another
commercial treaty.
15
Additionally, Germany exerted pressure on Lithuania to
assist in the September 1939 invasion of Poland, offering
Vilnius as the spoils. Lithuania refused, hoping that by
doing so it could maintain its neutrality and eventually
recover Vilnius peacefully. 6  Even with war clouds on the
horizon, the Lithuanian government believed it could constrain
German aggression through diplomatic means. It also
calculated that the Soviets might absorb Estonia and Latvia,
but leave Poland and Lithuania to act as a buffer between the
Soviet Union and Germany.
14Albert N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States





This proved to be a monumental miscalculation. In secret
supplementary protocols to the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact, Germany gave its blessing for the Soviet
Union to expand its sphere of influence into the Baltic
region.17  Within two months, Moscow had bullied the three
Baltic countries into signing mutual assistance pacts,
authorizing the Soviet army to station troops on their
territory.
These pacts guaranteed Baltic independence and pledged
Soviet non-interference in the internal affairs of the three
countries. Nevertheless, each was incorporated into the
Soviet Union within a year as the result of well-controlled
local elections.18 Russia's World War I loss of the eastern
Baltic littoral was at last reversed, and what appeared to
many to be a political vacuum was filled again by Soviet
annexation of the Baltic states.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding discussion suggests that the historical
legacy is not encouraging when it comes to considering the
compatibility of Baltic independence and European stability.
In fact, some would argue that European security is enhanced
17By the initial protocol, Lithuania was to fall under German
control. The next two protocols modified that agreement soLithuania would belong to the USSR. See: "Text of Secret Protocols
to 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact," New York Times, 24 August 1989, A10.
laMisiunas and Taagepera, 16.
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when the Baltic states are firmly under the control of a
strong outside power.19  With their tiny size, small
populations, and peaceful cultures, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania are dwarfed by their neighbors. Any time the three
states have been independent--and even at times when they were
not--they have been targeted by larger, more aggressive powers
who recognized the Baltic states' inability to resist coercion
effectively. In short, rather than being primary actors, the
three historically have been acted upon.
Estonia and Latvia were overrun even before they had a
chance to establish themselves as independent, native powers.
Until the 1700s, they developed culturally, religiously,
socially, and economically under German and Nordic influences.
At the same time that the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) was
bringing order to Europe and establishing the modern state
system, Estonia and Latvia remained in the clutches of Sweden.
Lithuania, on the other hand, had attained considerable power
and prestige, but now was locked in as junior partner in a
Polish-Lithuanian union and was becoming heavily Polonized.
19Stanley Page does as much when he argues that it is
impossible for the Baltic states to be independent, given their
strategic position. He believes their interwar freedom was
essentially an historical accident. See: The Formation of the
Baltic States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 184.
Of course, an opposing argument (one advanced by those favoring
Baltic secession) is that it is, instead, European instability that
is harmful to Baltic independence. From this perspective, the
Baltic states can remain sovereign if Europe itself remains stable.
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Thus, all three Baltic states were dependent in some manner
on another power for defense.
Through the centuries, the Balts have been pursued most
aggressively by Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union.
This was not for reasons of kinship. Although the three
Baltic states had evolved along separate lines, they all had
a European perspective, and there was no sense of
identification between them and Russia or other Slavic nations
of the empire. Rather, Russia was engaging in regional
expansion for economic and strategic reasons, and it
challenged the Baltic nations whether they were independent
or under another power's domination. After the third
partition of Poland, whereby Moscow finally took possession
of the entire area, the only power that seriously attempted
to contest its control was Germany, which did so in both world
wars. The difficulties that German troops posed for the
Soviet military on those two occasions only reinforced
Moscow's conviction that possessing the Baltic area was
crucial to Soviet national security.
In essence then, the Baltic legacy in international
relations is one of small, weakly-defended states occupying
an area viewed as strategically significant to aggressive
major powers. Unable to cooperate effectively among
themselves or with their neighbors to create a regional
collective security arrangement, and unable to stand alone
behind a shield of neutrality, they were often viewed as a
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power vacuum needing to be filled. In a world of realRolitik,
this had an adverse effect on European stability. Rather than
contributing to feelings of confidence and security, this
condition periodically fueled a mood of apprehension,
particularly among the smaller states of Europe. The result
might have been different, had the Baltic states been capable
of defending themselves or had they convinced neighbors to
respect their sovereignty. In that case, they might have
functioned instead as an anchor for Europe.
These circumstances also have had balance of power
implications, because each time the Baltic states changed
hands, Europe's equilibrium also shifted. This was especially
apparent when Russia took control of the area, and later when
the Soviets annexed it again (as is discussed in Chapter III).
Even the threat that the Baltic states might change hands
could be troublesome. For example, on the eve of World War
II, Great Britain and France both wanted the Baltic countries
to remain independent and to participate in a regional
collective security arrangement, yet they were ready to offer
the Soviet Union a free hand in the area. They did so because
they recognized that the neutral Baltic governments would be
unable to resist military advances against them. They were
particularly worried over how much the European balance of
power would shift if Hitler was permitted to control the
Baltic region. At the same time, Britain and France felt they
could not grant their own Great Power guarantee of protection
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to the Balts, first, because they were already overextended
and so could not offer credible protection and, secondly,
because they felt it was a regional problem that could be
exacerbated by their outside intrusion. It could upset an
already shaky balance in the area. Therefore, they decided
Soviet control was the best option for deterring German
ambitions, and were preparing to make that happen when they
were undercut by Ribbentrop's diplomatic coup--the 1939 Nazi-
Soviet Pact.
20Clearly, the optimum situation would have been an agreement
among all the Great Powers that European security would be best
served by a joint guarantee of Baltic independence. However,
ineffective diplomacy on the part of all, plus aggressive
intentions by Germany and the USSR, prevented that from occurring.
It is likely that Britain and France understood that their
guarantee of Poland already was unrealistic, and that they did not
want to compound the problem with a non-credible guarantee of the
Baltic states.
23
III. PRESENT: SECURITY ROLE IN POST-WORLD WAR II ERA
A. CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY
The Soviet Union took advantage of a breakdown in the
international order during 1939-40 to annex the Baltic states.
After the war, it added to these gains by extracting
concessions from Finland and by holding onto captured East
Prussia (renamed Kaliningrad oblast). Through these actions,
the Soviet Union not only satisfied long-standing expansionist
urges, but it also improved important facets of its national
security. A review of some of these defense considerations
will help explain how the three Baltic states have affected
European security from 1945-1990.
1. Creating a "Soviet Lake"
Many military analysts contend that, in terms of
political and military geography, possession of the three
Baltic republics enabled Moscow to turn the Baltic Sea into
a virtual Soviet lake in the post-World War II years.21 Of the
seven littoral countries, two became NATO allies (Denmark,
Federal Republic of Germany), two became neutral (Finland,
Sweden), and three joined the Warsaw Pact (Soviet Union,
21See, for example: Mathew J. Whelan, "The Soviet Baltic Fleet:
An Amphibious Force in Being," U.S. Naval Institute ProceedinQs
107, no. 12 (December 1981): 122-125, and John Johnston, "The
Baltic--NATO's Weak Link?" Jane's Defence Weekly 8, no. 23 (12
December 1987): 1373-1375.
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Poland, German Democratic Republic). Clearly, unification of
the two Germanies and steady disintegration of the Warsaw Pact
during 1990 has altered this situation. However, for most of
the post-war era, over one-third of the sea coast has belonged
to the Soviet Union and its allies, and most of the remainder
has been neutral. The Soviet Red Banner Baltic Sea Fleet has
ruled over this "lake" without a strong NATO blue-water
challenge for most of this period.
2. Support for the Baltic Sea Fleet
Appendix A shows that Estonia and Latvia--Lithuania
to a much lesser degree--are valuable to the Soviet Navy.
Their ports and maintenance facilities furnish important
operational and logistical support.22 All told, 50 percent of
the Soviet Union's ship construction and repair yards is
situated on the Baltic Sea; many are found in Estonia and
Latvia. 2 Such facilities are important not only for the
Baltic Fleet, but for Northern Fleet assets as well.
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22Unclassified literature is limited and sketchy, but a good
picture can be pieced together by studying: Norman Polmar, Guide
to the Soviet Nay (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), Jan
Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design. Development and Tactics (UK:
Jane's Defense Data, 1989), and Andris Trapans, Soviet Military
Power in the Baltic Area (Stockholm: Lettiska Nationella Fonden,
1986).
Hans Garde, "Alliance Navies and the Threat in the Northern
Waters," Naval War College Review 38, no. 2 (March-April 1985): 43.
24A canal connecting the Baltic and White Seas permits ships
and submarines displacing up to 5,200 tons to pass from the
Northern Fleet to Baltic yards. See: J.K. Davis and R.L.
Pfaltzgraff, Soviet Theater Strateav (Washington, DC: US Strategic
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The Baltic Sea's low salinity and northern latitudes
combine to create severe icing problems in many parts of the
sea during winter months.25 Leningrad and its approaches are
particularly susceptible. Therefore, the fact that most
Estonian and Latvian ports are ice-free all year long is of
strategic importance to Baltic Sea Fleet operations, and is
a major reason why Stalin felt it important to reacquire the
Baltic states.
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Two additional benefits to the Baltic Sea Fleet should
be noted. By being able to disperse its assets among many
ports along the entire coast, the Soviet navy increases its
survivability, and it alleviates crowded berthing conditions
in Leningrad and Kaliningrad.
3. Protecting Sea Approaches to Leningrad
Possession of Estonia has been of particular
importance to Soviet defense planners, because it forms an
integral part of the approaches to Leningrad, which is the
Soviet Union's second largest city, primary ship building and
Institute, 1978), 28. Vessels sometimes had problems transiting
the canal during World War II, but Marian K. Leighton notes that
it was enlarged in the 1970s. See: The Soviet Threat to NATO's
Northern Flank (New York: National Strategy Information Center,
Inc., 1979), 23-24.
2Milan Vego, an expert in Soviet naval operations, claims that
ice halts navigation in the Gulf of Riga for 30-80 days per year,
and he says it is not unusual for the entire Gulf of Bothnia to
freeze over during severe winters. See: "The Baltic Naval
Operations," Navy International 88, no. 2 (February 1983): 70.
26Trapans, 16.
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repair center, and an important center for defense research
and development. Because of the unusual shape of the Baltic
Sea and Gulf of Finland, Leningrad-based ships must transit
a narrow waterway in order to reach open seas. If hostile
forces control the adjacent coasts, these transiting ships can
become highly vulnerable. When the Soviet Union lost control
of southern Finland and the Baltic republics during World Wars
I and II, the Baltic Fleet was forced to spend much of its
time bottled up in port by ice and German mines.27  By
reestablishing control over the Baltic republics in the 1940s,
the Kremlin attempted to resolve this strategic dilemma.
4. Shield Against Air Attack
With the rise of air power and the concomitant
compression of warning time, Soviet military strategists
quickly recognized the importance of a Baltic air defense
buffer to protect Leningrad, Moscow, and the Soviet heartland
against enemy air attacks out of the west. Accordingly, they
created an elaborate air defense network in the Baltic
republics, consisting of early warning radars, coastal
artillery sites, and surface-to-air missile complexes.
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Soviet fighter aircraft squadrons were also based in the three
republics to provide additional protection for these vital air
27Breemer, chapters 2 and 3, provides an excellent account of
this dilemma.
2International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 1989-90 (London: Brassey's, 1989), 38.
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corridors. An unconditional loss of the Baltic republics,
then, would require air defense assets to be moved back into
Belorussia or Russia, and would further complicate the
Soviets' indications and warning problem.
5. Clearly Defined Border
As Don Kerr of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London has observed, much of Russian
history has been dedicated to establishing clearly defined
borders. Particularly in the west, Soviet terrain is open
and flat, lacking any mountains or major rivers to act as
clear-cut, natural boundaries. By possessing the Baltic
republics, however, the Soviet Union has a geographical
feature which conclusively delineates a portion .f its western
border--a sea shore. That the other side of this demarcation
is a large body of water, rather than a potentially hostile
foreign power, is an added benefit.
6. Buffer with Poland
Another analyst contends that, while Estonia and
Latvia have been most important to the Soviet Union for their
access to the sea, Lithuania's most significant contribution
has been as a buffer against Polish nationalism. The Soviet
Union and Poland may have been allies since World War II, but
29Cited by Bill Minutaglio in "Experts Call Baltic Region
Crucial to Soviet Defense," Baltimore Sun, 01 April 1990, 12.
Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (Archon Books, 1967),
104.
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the two have a much longer history of mistrust and mutual
aggression. Lithuania's location, therefore, offers some
degree of insulation. Additionally, Moscow occasionally has
been able to exploit historical Lithuanian-Polish tensions to
further its interests in the region.
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7. Keeping Kaliningrad Contiguous
By possessing Lithuania, Moscow also prevents
Kaliningrad from being cut-off and surrounded by two foreign
powers (Lithuania and Poland). The province is of major naval
importance, including as it does, the Baltic Fleet
Headquarters, numerous ship repair and construction
facilities, a Soviet Naval Infantry brigade, and a Spetsnaz
brigade.32 Supply lines for these and other important military
facilities and organizations run directly through Lithuania.
Therefore, the loss of that republic would sever Kaliningrad
from the rest of the Union and effectively make it an island.
Because of national security implications this would have for
the Soviet Union, special air and land access routes across
31For example, the day before Lithuania's declaration of
independence, the Kremlin attempted to undercut the republic and
foment unrest by broadcasting a television program emphasizing past
territorial conflicts and past problems of ethnic Poles in
Lithuania. See: Anatol Lieven, "Moscow Plays the Polish Card in
Warning to Lithuania," The Times (London), 14 March 1990, 11.
32Polmar, 457-472. Additionally, the USSR's largest
concentration of nuclear warheads reportedly is spread across
Kaliningrad and Lithuania. See: Bill Gertz, "Lithuania Home to
Nuclear Arsenal," Washington Times, 23 April 1990, 1.
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Lithuania undoubtedly will be a major Soviet demand in any
independence negotiations.
S. Springboard into Europe
In addition to supporting Soviet naval and air defense
forces, the three republics are home to forces of the Baltic
Military District (BMD)--one of 16 peacetime districts, and
a component of the Soviet Western Theater.33 Reestablished
in 1945, the BMD provides the Soviet High Command with second
echelon forces for reinforcing the Warsaw Pact and protecting
its flanks during any conflict in Europe.3
Because BMD emphasis appears to be on "light" units,
such as airborne assault35 and motorized rifle divisions,
Western military analysts in the Cold War era generally have
envisioned Baltic forces being used in an assault on the
Danish Straits region, possibly including southern Sweden and
southern Norway. Capturing Denmark would divide NATO's
northern and central commands and, thus, contribute to a
Warsaw Pact envelopment operation against Central Europe.
6
3Office of the Secretary of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1988), 13-15.
34John Erickson, Lynn Hansen, and William Schneider, Soviet
Ground Forces (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 39.
35A third of all Soviet airborne divisions are stationed in the
BMD. See: Trapans, 40.
36Gordon H. McCormick, Stranaer Than Fiction: Soviet Submarine




Possession of the Baltic states, therefore, has
provided the Soviet Union with a potential springboard into
Europe in the event of conflict. In the words of one military
analyst, "that's why they were taken over by Stalin in the
first place.',37  Troops and equipment prepositioned in the
three states--from Western Europe's perspective--have allowed
the Moscow a forward-leaning security posture. Further, their
role in defending the Soviet Union's western boundary would
be important in wartime, particuilarly if the Soviet Fleet
proved unable to deny use of the Baltic Sea to enemy navies.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Rather than cultivate a buffer of "Finlandized" peripheral
states after World War II, the Soviet Union opted instead to
integrate the Baltic states thoroughly into its national
security strategy. Eastern European allies accepted this, if
for no other reason than because their foreign and military
policies were directed, in large part, from Moscow. For
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, these circumstances brought
relative stability, but at an unacceptable price--total loss
of sovereignty and subjection to extreme cultural and
demographic Russification. Not only did they end up playing
37Peter Ludlow, as quoted by Minutaglio, 12.
3The effects of this Russification process are discussed in
considerable detail in Misiunas and Taagepera, and in Mikhail
Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power (New York: Summit
Books, 1986).
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reluctant host to the Soviet military, they also were forced
to serve in that military under a policy of
"extraterritoriality. "l39
What has the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania meant for European security from the West's point
of view? Sweden and Nazi Germany quickly moved to recognize
the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltic states.40 However,
other Western countries rejected de jure recognition and many,
including the United States, have continued to maintain
relations with Baltic governments-in-exile.1
Even so, some observers contend that, as the Iron Curtain
descended and the post-War international community settled
into a tight East-West bipolarity, the West came to regard the
Baltic republics as part of the Soviet Union on a de facto
basis.42 British Prime Minister Thatcher has stated on several
39Military analysts use the term "extraterritoriality" to
describe stationing of soldiers away from their own ethnic regions.
The Kremlin believed that, in the event of a crisis or disorder,
an army composed of outsiders would be less likely to disobey
orders or side with the local population. For further discussion,
see: S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, The Ethnic Factor in the
Soviet Armed Forces, R-2787/1 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,
1982), 11-14.
40The German parliament did not have time to ratify this policy
before the war with the USSR broke out, making Sweden the only
Western country to recognize the incorporation. See: Meissner,
147.
41Paula J. Dobriansky, "The Baltic States in an Era of Soviet
Reform, Devartment of State Bulletin 89, no. 2147 (June 1989): 37.
'
2Rauch (p. 234) claims the British and French have granted
what amounts to de facto recognition. For additional legal
discussions on this topic, see Meissner, 147.
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occasions that she believes the 1975 Helsinki Final Act
constituted de facto recognition of the incorporation.43 The
United States disagrees with the British interpretation of the
Accords, and has meticulously avoided actions over the years
which might suggest acceptance of the Soviet annexation of
the Baltic states."
Nonetheless, even President Bush--who made repeated
references to "captive nations" during his 1988 Presidential
campaign--probably would agree that U.S. security planning and
war fighting strategies have treated the occupied Baltic
states as a Soviet military stronghold and, therefore,
"hostile."45 As previously discussed, the Soviets have manned
and equipped the region in such a manner as to be perceived
as an invasion springboard, and this threat had to be
countered.
Therefore, the occupied Baltic republics as "one of them"
gradually evolved as a feature of the post-War, bipolar
international order. Simply put, the West had to view the
43For example, see: Chris Moncrieff, "Thatcher Telephones
Gorbachev on Lithuania," London Press Association, 28 March 1990,
as cited in FBIS-WEU-90-0612, 29 March 1990, 3.
"Harold S. Russell, "The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or
Lilliput?" The American Journal of International Law 70, no. 2
(April 1976): 249-251.
45An analogy would be the situation which exists in Kuwait at
this writing. Though the international community sympathetically
views that nation as occupied, it also believes the territory
represents a threat to the region, because of the vast Iraqi
arsenal deployed there.
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Baltic region as hostile, even though it viewed the Balts
themselves as captives. Although Western leaders wanted the
Baltic Question to be resolved, they understood very well that
righting the wrongs of 1940 could be done only by force.
Therefore, they let the situation stand. This decision
perhaps was made easier by their realization that the region
was relatively stable (despite the fact that European security
was based on a seemingly dangerous nuclear balance)--there
were no vacuums that needed filling. Western hesitancy to
offer significant assistance to the current Baltic secession
movement may be traced, in part, to a reluctance to disturb
that status quo."
Before closing this chapter, one final issue should be
raised. Although the Baltic states have been thoroughly
subsumed within the Soviet national defense plan, the question
that must be considered is whether this contribution is so
great that the Kremlin cannot allow secession, simply on the
grounds of national security. Only Moscow can say for sure,
because this judgment requires a careful assessment, not only
of security variables, but of the broader political, economic,
and cultural considerations as well.
"John Van Oudenaren has noted a consistent, traditional
timidity on the part of the West to take advantage of revolutionary
opportunities to help Soviet allies break from the USSR's grasp.
The same trend appears to apply to the Baltic states. See:
EX'loiting 'Fault Lines' in the Soviet Em ire: An Overview (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 1984), 15.
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However, there are sound reasons for believing that the
loss of the Baltic states could be manageable from a Soviet
security point of view. First, it is worth noting that the
most critical Baltic Fleet facilities are concentrated in
Leningrad and Kaliningrad, neither of which is threatening
secession. Military facilities in those two areas would
remain intact, though it is recognized that operations in an
isolated Kaliningrad would be more complicated than in the
past.
Second, some would maintain that many of the Baltic bases
have long lost their significance, partly because of
technology improvements and partly because of a reduced threat
from the West.47 According to this view, most, if not all, of
the facilities could be pulled back to Belorussia--assuming
it too does not secede--and still provide Moscow an acceptable
level of security.
A third argument is that the Soviets themselves realize
the Baltic Fleet is not as important as Stalin and his
predecessors thought. A reevaluation that began under
Khrushchev culminated in a strategic shift in favor of the
Northern Fleet during the 1970s. As a result, there has been
a steady decrease in the Baltic naval order of battle, both
47See, for example: "The Empire Cannot Be Saved," Der Spiegel,
09 April 1990, 171-80, as cited in FBIS-SOV-90-069, 10 April 1990,
87-90.
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in absolute terms and relative to other fleets.48 It remains
far and away the Baltic Sea's dominant navy, and the necessity
for such a force is now debatable--particularly in view of the
virtual disappearance of a Warsaw Pact flank in need of
protection, the significantly-reduced East-West tensions, and
Moscow's stated intention to transition toward a strictly
defensive posture.
A fourth reason why Moscow might find the loss of the
Baltic states and their facilities a manageable proposition
is that a pull-back of Soviet troops from their forward-
leaning position in the Baltics might further enhance Western
Europe's feelings of security. Having the mainstay of forward
forces positioned defensively in the Ukraine and Belorussia
would appear much less threatening than having them in
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Thus, a Soviet pull-back
could be touted as a confidence and security building measure
and used as a bargaining chip for some type of concessions
from the West.
A final reason derives from a balancing of benefits
against liabilities. One reason the Soviet Union annexed the
three states and made satellites of Eastern European countries
"This decline is discussed by A.F. Nicholas in "The Fifty-
Year Development of the Soviet Baltic Fleet," Armed Forces 5, no.
3 (March 1986): 120-124. For a more in-depth statistical break-
down, see: John Kristen Skogan, The Evolution of the Four Soviet
Fleets 1968-1987, a presentation given at International Comparative
Workshop on Soviet Seapower 06-10 June 1988 (Oslo: Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs).
36
was to enhance Soviet security. It might be argued that
President Gorbachev pulled out of Eastern Europe because the
costs of maintaining Soviet hegemony in the area finally
outweighed benefits. Similarly, costs are going up in the
Baltic region in the form of nationalist unrest and rising
anti-military sentiment. 49 As a result, it is possible that
the Baltic states could outgrow their usefulness. Granting
independence not only would alleviate that problem, it might
provide an opportunity to create the "Finlandized" buffer that
Stalin allegedly set out to create in Eastern Europe following
World War II.
A senior Soviet naval officer, recently reached many of
these same conclusions.50  Valeriy Myasnikov believes that
agreements to allow a continued military presence in the three
republics can be reached. However, he also feels that the
military could adapt without significant difficulty to even
a worst-case scenario, in which all three secede
unconditionally. In Myasnikov's estimation, the most
troublesome problem in that case would be the adverse effects
on air defense--this would degrade warning time and require
an increase of 300-350 kilometers in the operational range of
combat aircraft.
49Stephen Foye, "Growing Antimilitary Sentiment in the
Republics," Report on the USSR 1, no. 50 (15 December 1989): 1-4.
50Valeriy Myasnikov, "Soviet Baltic Fleet Could Survive
Lithuanian Independence," Svenska Dagbladet, 26 July 1990, 3, as
cited in FBIS-SOV-90-148, 01 August 1990, 52-53.
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IV. REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN LITHUANIA
When attempting to understand how the Baltic Question might
affect future European security options, one should consider how
the international community has reacted to Baltic secessionist
activities in 1990. It is clear that these reactions cannot be
taken as a predictor of final diplomatic positions--there are
simply too many other fundamental changes occurring between the
major powers which could dramatically affect resolution of the
Baltic problem. Nonetheless, initial reactions often reflect basic
biases, so it is reasonable to believe they provide a fair
indication of what types of arrangements the international
community might willingly accommodate. In short, the foundations
for future security, economic, political, and cultural relations
are being laid now.
At the outset of this discussion, it should be noted that the
reactions being considered are largely in response to Lithuanian
activities. Latvia and Estonia also have taken steps toward
independence, but it was Lithuania that made the first and most
radical moves. As a result, international attention was drawn to
it first. Despite the Baltic states' differing historical
circumstances and ethnic composition,5' a review of public
51In addition to historical and cultural differences,
Russification has resulted in demographic dissimilarities. While
ethnic Lithuanians comprise 80 percent of that republic's
population, ethnic Estonians account for only 61 percent or theirs,
and Latvians hold a bare 52 percent majority. As a result, the two
northern republics believe they must move toward independence at
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statements and available literature suggests that most observers
tend to lump the three states together as a single entity.
Further, there appears to be an underlying assumption that whatever
concessions Lithuania wins, the others will too. Neither
perception is necessarily true, but the fact remains that most
commentary continues to focus on Lithuania. Consequently, as this
chapter attempts to gauge the depth of international support for
Baltic independence, it is, in fact, investigating official
reactions to developments in Lithuania. The countries under
consideration probably have the greatest influence over how the
Baltic Question will be resolved: the Soviet Union, neighboring
Poland, the United States, three major Western European countries
(Great Britain, France, and Germany), and four Nordic countries
(Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark).
A. SOVIET RESISTANCE
In the opening months of 1990, Moscow demonstrated--through
the actions of its top leaders--that the right of secession
guaranteed in the Soviet constitution is a vacuous promise, and
that the central government opposes independence for Lithuania or
any other republic. During his January 1990 visit to Vilnius,
President Gorbachev hinted that the republic would be allowed to
secede if it was patient and compensated Moscow for past Soviet
a slower pace to ensure they retain public support.
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investments in the area.52 Given subsequent developments, however,
it is likely that the offer was meant to defuse the existing
tension and buy time, in the hopes that legislation could be
enacted later which would carry the weight of law, offer hope, and
yet make secession virtually impossible.
Clearly, Moscow underestimated Lithuania's resolve, for rather
than deterring the republic, Gorbachev's offer raised hopes and
expectations. The Kremlin's next step was to propose a fee of
staggering proportions.53 Again, Lithuania showed no hesitation and
pressed ahead, ultimately declaring independence on 11 March 1990.
Speaking for the Soviet government, President Gorbachev
immediately denounced the declaration as "illegitimate and
invalid."'54 Subsequently, the central government did its utmost to
isolate Lithuania, prevent coordinated Baltic efforts, and avoid
negotiations. Westerners are well-acquainted with the Kremlin's
use of military troops in Vilnius, the eviction of foreign
journalists and diplomats from Lithuania, and the subsequent
economic blockade. Perhaps less well known is the fact that the
central media was directed to wage a misinformation campaign, which
analyst Vera Tolz finds to be "unprecedented in the era of glasnost
52Esther B. Fein, "Gorbachev Urges Lithuania to Stay with
Soviet Union," New York Times, 12 January 1990, Al.
53Economist Lawrence Summers calculates the $33 billion
demanded by Gorbachev to be approximately 50 times the annual
income of Lithuanian workers. He also contends the investments are
worth only one-tenth of Moscow's asking price. See: "Gorbachev
Should Pay Lithuania," New York Times, 14 March 1990, A19.
54Esther B. Fein, "Lithuania Move is Illegitimate, Gorbachev
Says," New York Times, 14 March 1990, Al.
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and can only be compared with Soviet media coverage of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. '115 A review of Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translations confirms her
observation that newspapers, letters to editors, radio roundtable
discussions, and television programs were overwhelmingly one-
sided, anti-Lithuanian, and frequently distorted foreign
commentary.
Another indication that the Soviet Union does not support the
right of secession came in April, when the Supreme Soviet passed
a law outlining the process to be followed. The requirements set
down by this law proved so strenuous, that critics quickly and
accurately dubbed it the law against secession.56 Other signs of
opposition have emanated from the Soviet military, where senior
officers frequently have called for Gorbachev to use his
Presidential powers to crack down on secessionists. Additionally,
retired officers helped create Interfront and Yedinstvo to organize
resistance among Russians and active duty military officers living
in the three republics.
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Moscow's goal is to keep its Union intact, even though this
appears to run counter to popular sentiment--as of this writing,
55Vera Tolz, "Central Media Wage Propaganda Campaign Against
Lithuania," ReDort on the USSR 2, no. 15 (13 April 1990): 1.
56For example, see: Paul Goble, "Gorbachev, Secession and the
Fate of Reform," Report on the USSR 2, no. 17 (27 April 1990): 1,
and Ann Sheehy, "Supreme Soviet Adopts Law on Mechanics of
Secession," Report on the USSR 2, no. 17 (27 April 1990): 2-5.
57Anatol Lieven, "Baltic Deserters Hit at Root of Soviet
Empire," Times (London), 23 March 1990, 8.
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Kazakhstan is the only one of the Soviet Union's 15 republics that
has not made official moves toward increased autonomy or
independence. The central government hopes to achieve its goal by
drafting a new Union Treaty which will seduce republics into
remaining in a "new and improved" Soviet Union. This strategy can
be expected to continue until either the political or economic
costs become too great, the Baltics and other radical republics
give up, or the Soviets fall victim to the total disintegration




Poland's reactions are also important to consider because of
that country's historical connections with Lithuania, a shared
border, and the Polish-Baltic frictions of the inter-war years.
To date, these reactions have been highly favorable. An April 1990
opinion poll demonstrated the "public's almost unanimous acceptance
of Lithuania's right to be independent," and found that 43 percent
believed independence should be both immediate and unconditiona .59
The same poll reported that 83 percent believed Lithuania would be
a friendly neighbor.
Many political parties and groups also have indicated their
58Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism," Foreian
Affairs 68, no. 5 (Winter 1989/90): 1-25.
59
"Public Opinion Supports Lithuanian Independence,"
RzeczDosDolita (Warsaw), 11 April 1990, 1, as cited in FBIS-EEU-
90-074, 17 April 1990, 23.
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support, and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa has been particularly
sympathetic to the Baltic cause. He has been very critical of
Soviet policies toward Lithuania, saying they are undermining "the
process aimed at establishing a new order in Europe.''6 The
government is more circumspect, but it too supports Lithuanian
self-determination and independence. Without mentioning the Soviet
Union by name, one of its first official statements carefully noted
that Poles want good relations with all of their neighbors.61 That
has remained the official Polish position.
In addition to political issues, it is important to address
ethnic and territorial issues when considering relations between
Poland and Lithuania, particularly in view of the mistrust of the
1920-30s. Ethnic Poles comprise seven percent (260,000) of
Lithuania's 3.7 million people, and in the years since World War
II, the Polish government occasionally has expressed concern over
their treatment. However, a number of bilateral initiatives
designed to ensure the rights of Poles in Lithuania and Lithuanians
in Poland have been signed in the past two years, and seem to have
resolved most concerns. Warsaw has not expressed any significant
anxiety regarding the ethnic Polish community since Lithuania's
declaration of independence.
6"Walesa Appeals for Negotiations in Lithuania," Paris AFP,
27 March 1990, as cited in FBIS-EEU-90-059, 27 March 1990, 36.
61John Kifner, "Poland's Leaders Praise Lithuania," New York
Times, 13 March 1990, A6.
6Saulius Girnius and Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Current Issues
in Polish-Lithuanian Relations," Report on Eastern EuroDe 1, no.
2 (12 January 1990): 40-42.
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Similarly, there is no sign that territorial issues will pose
problems between Warsaw and Vilnius. More than a third of
Lithuania's Poles live in the Lithuanian capital (18 percent of the
city's population), which lies in an area claimed by Poland in the
1920-30s.6 However, a Polish delegation, which traveled to
Lithuania immediately following the declaration of independence,
issued a statement that Poland sees the border between the two
countries "to be as permanent as the Oder-Neisse border," a line
that now appears secure.
6
'
C. RELUCTANT AMERICANS, BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMANS
Upon hearing Lithuania's 11 March 1990 announcement, the
United States immediately assumed a cautious position. President
Bush urged peaceful dialogue, reiterated America's traditional non-
recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltics, and avoided
actions or statements which could precipitate a crisis or
exacerbate Mikhail Gorbachev's domestic predicament.65 On occasions
when the President did issue warnings to the Soviets, he generally
included statements to the effect that it is in America's strategic
interests to avoid jeopardizing arms control talks, trade
negotiations, and gains in Eastern Europe.
This restrained White House position was arguably the
6Girnius and Sabbat-Swidlicka, 41.
""Parliamentary Delegation in Vilnius," Report on Eastern
Europe 1, no. 14 (06 April 1990): 55.
65See, for example: Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Advises Moscow
to 'Respect' Lithuania," New York Times, 12 March 1990, A8.
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international community's most significant, because it appeared to
set the tone for other countries. Had the United States strongly
endorsed Lithuania's declaration or extended diplomatic
recognition, it is reasonable to expect that many other countries
would have followed suit. An examination of articles in The Times,
The Guardian, The Economist, Reuters, and FBIS soon after
Lithuania's declaration reveals that Western European leaders and
journalists tended to cite facts and analyze the situation in terms
of American and Soviet reactions, with little or no comment on
their own positions.
When West European leaders did take public stands, they
closely paralleled the U.S. position. Great Britain's official
policy urged dialogue, warned against the use of force, and alerted
Soviets and Lithuanians alike to its concern for peace and
stability. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
warned Britons against raising Baltic expectations, but also
cautioned the Kremlin not to trick the Baltic states "into a cul-
de-sac" (referring to the new secession law) which could increase
frustration and promote violence. When Prime Minister Prunskiene
visited London in May, Prime Minister Thatcher pleaded for
Lithuanian moderation and compromise in order to preserve East-
West gains being brought about by President Gorbachev.
67
France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) also
66
"Soviet Union Warned of Baltic Perils," The Times (London),
06 April 1990, 7.
67Craig R. Whitney, "Thatcher Urges Lithuanian to Compromise
With Soviets," New York Times, 10 May 1990, A10.
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maintained a low profile on the Lithuanian issue, presumably
because they did not want to jeopardize the ongoing political and
economic restructuring of Europe. As Marshall Ingwerson has
observed, "the Germans are consumed with working out
reunification", and "France has been pushing for rapid European
integration. ,,
Despite their low-key approach, France and the FRG became the
first West European countries to make a high-level, diplomatic move
to resolve the Soviet-Lithuanian impasse. In late April 1990, they
jointly called upon Lithuania to suspend temporarily its
declaration and make other concessions. This proposal was
designed to be a face-saving way for Lithuania and the Soviet Union
to come to the bargaining table, and both sides did greet it
favorably. However, neither France nor the FRG followed through
with a public diplomatic offensive, and France immediately ruled
out acting as mediator.70 As a result, the initiative achieved no
tangible results except to remind Moscow of the West's continuing
interest in the matter.
The generally cautious and vague stand adopted by the major
Western powers should not be taken as being anti-Baltic
68Marshall Ingwerson, "Bush Faces Balancing Act Over Lithuanian
Crisis," Christian Science Monitor, 23 April 1990, 8.
69Hella Pick claims that this initiative, which excluded Great
Britain, was actually orchestrated by President Bush to defuse
domestic calls for sanctions. See: "US arranged Lithuania Peace
Initiative," The Guardian (Manchester), 30 April 1990, 1.
70
"Lithuania Urges Paris and Bonn to Act as Mediators With
Soviets," New York Times, 03 May 1990, A8.
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independence. Rather, it reflects their wider interests and
different priorities. The United States, Great Britain, France,
and Germany look forward to welcoming sovereign Baltic countries
into the European order and to expanding political and economic
ties with them. However, none is willing to jeopardize broader
agendas to help the Baltic states achieve independence. For
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, this reaction is strikingly
reminiscent of the response they received when facing Soviet and
German aggression in the 1930-40s.
D. "NORDEN" SUPPORT
In contrast to the generally guarded reactions emanating from
the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, energetic debates
and expressions of support have occurred in the "well-defined
regional subdivision of the European subcontinent" that
Scandinavians call "Norden"--the five states of Finland, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, and Iceland.71 These countries are also among the
most active in attempting to increase contacts at all levels with
the Baltic republics. Further, it is primarily to these states
that Baltic leaders have traveled with appeals for assistance. As
is discussed in Chapter V, this Norden support has distinct
71Vincent H. Malmstrom discusses in detail the manner in which
history and culture link the people of these five nations in:
Norden: crossroads of Destiny and Progress (Princeton, NJ: D. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965).
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implications for the future and is the reason why this thesis is
treating reactions of these countries as a separate group.
2
1. Finland
The Finns not only have historical links to the Baltic
republics, they have dramatically increased trade, cultural and
political contacts since 1988. 7 However, because Finland must
always be careful not to upset its delicate "special relationship"
with the Soviet Union, its reactions to Baltic secessionist
activities have been perhaps the most restrained of the Nordic
group. Premier Holkeri's immediately announced that Finland would
state its position on Lithuania's declaration only after Moscow and
Vilnius reached agreement on the matter. Since then, he and
Foreign Minister Paasio have emphasized Finland's traditional
political moderation whenever defending their subdued support for
the Baltics.
In general, Finland's reactions demonstrate that it
perceives developments in the three republics as affecting all
states in the region. In so doing, it is treating them almost as
though they are part of the "Nordic Balance" which has guided
Reactions of the Baltic states' closest neighbors--Finland,
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are examined here. The sentiments of
the fifth Nordic nation, Iceland, are also supportive.
73Sole Lahtinen, "Finland's Vice Consulate Waiting for Space,"
HelsinQin Sanomat, 18 December 1989, 26, as cited in JPRS-UIA-90-
003L, 05 March 1990, 3.
74
"Holkeri Comments on Recognition of Lithuania,: Helsinki
International Service, 12 March 1990, as cited in FBIS-WEU-90-049,
13 March 1990, 25.
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Scandinavian policies and actions for decades. Therefore, it
urges caution, stability, and settlement of the matter in
accordance with guidelines of the 1975 Helsinki Accords (i.e.,
borders will be redrawn only by peacefully negotiated agreement
between sides to any dispute).
2. Sweden
Like Finland, Sweden has historical connections to the
Baltic region, and it too has increased significantly its cultural
and political contacts with the three republics since 1988. This
has occurred quietly, however, because as French analyst Alain
Debove has observed, Sweden, like Finland, wants to avoid a crisis
with Moscow and not have its neutrality questioned.
76
Sweden is sensitive to the fact that it was the only
Western country (May 1941) to recognize the Soviet incorporation
of the Baltic states7, and so traditionally has been discreet in
its public statements on the region. The government quickly
welcomed Lithuania's declaration, but added that there could be no
75For an indepth explanation of the dynamic workings of the
Nordic Balance, see Arne Brundtland, "The Context of Security in
Northern Europe," in Northern Europe: Security Issues for the
1990's, ed. P.M. Cole and D.M. Hart (Boulder: Westview Press,
1986), 15-18. In his discussion of the subject, Rodney Kennedy-
Minott notes that many Finns and Swedes prefer the phrase "Nordic
stability," because they feel "Nordic Balance" implies an alliance
system. See: U.S. Regional Force Application: The Maritime
Stratecv and its Effect on Nordic Stability (Hoover Institution:
Stanford University, 1988), 36.
76Alain Debove, "Retrouvailles autour de la Baltique," Le
Monde, 05 January 1990, 5.
Nazi Germany became caught up in its invasion of the Soviet
Union and never did formally recognize the annexation.
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official recognition until that state gains effective control over
its territory.7 Despite minor personal frictions between Swedish
Foreign Minister Andersson and Lithuanian President Landsbergis,
79
the Swedish government has pledged Sweden's whole-hearted economic,
political and diplomatic support to solve the Baltic problem
according to Helsinki principles. Additionally, there have been
numerous rallies and media editorials in support of Lithuania, as
well as calls by opposition conservative and liberal parties to
give more active support.
3. Norway
The Norwegian government immediately welcomed Lithuania's
declaration, and then began to follow the type of low-key, non-
recognition strategy taken by most of the international community.
This initial passive approach brought Foreign Minister Bondevik
under heavy fire from many politicians who felt that, because the
Baltic people feel closely tied to the Nordic states, Norway has
an obligation to become the "initiator" in this process.0
T
"Sweden Withholds Recognition of Lithuania," Reuter Library
ReDOrt, 13 March 1990.
9Foreign Minister Andersson initially drew the ire of
President Landsbergis (as well as many Swedes), when he described
Soviet actions in Lithuania as both "reasonable" and "more
responsible" than the U.S. invasion of Panama. See: "Sweden
Supports Soviet Actions in Lithuania," Router Library Report, 27
March 1990.
8Geir Salvesen, "Bondevik Criticized for Lithuania,"
Aftenlosten, 22 March 1990, 6, as cited in FBIS-WEU-90-071, 12
April 1990, 44.
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Though the government generally has followed the
international community's lead, it has tended to be more bluntly
outspoken. For example, the Foreign Minister summoned the Soviet
Ambassador in March to warn against any use of force and received
assurances none would be used.8' When Soviet forces employed
ruthless force the next day to arrest deserters and seize Communist
Party buildings in Vilnius, the Norwegian government issued a
statement saying "the brutal actions now carried out by the Soviet
military are a shocking and unwise step.''a The statement, which
sounds mild, was actually a scathing diplomatic indictment,
particularly when compared to the reactions of other governments
to the same incident: White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater
viewed the matter "with deep concern;" Prime Minister Thatcher
declared that "force is not an appropriate way to settle the
problem;" President Mitterrand said "our role is not to pour oil
on the fire;" and Foreign Minister Andersson of Sweden claimed the
Soviets were "acting responsibly.''8
Additionally, Norway was the only country to offer to
sell oil to Lithuania during the Kremlin's economic blockade. To
be sure, this offer was less than effusive and included no grants
or other promises. The government merely authorized Lithuania to
81"Norway Foreign Minister Calls in Soviet Ambassador on
Lithuania," Reuter Library Report, 26 March 1990.
2"Norway Condemns Soviet Union Over Lithuania," Reuter Library
Report, 27 March 1990.
8Andrew Rosenthal, "U.S. Softens Tone on Lithuania Issue,"
New York Times, 28 March 1990, Al.
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buy oil at whatever prices Norwegian oil companies were willing to
sell. 4 Nonetheless, it was a public declaration of support and
a bold step in a sea of international diplomatic hesitation.
4. Denmark
Denmark, like Sweden and Finland, has increased its
connections with the Baltic republics in recent years. A month
prior to Lithuania's declaration of independence, Foreign Minister
Ellemann-Jensen came under pressure from many groups to become even
more active in promoting the Baltic cause. Though he held out
against any increase in diplomatic contacts, he agreed it was time
to offer the three republics a share in Danish aid to Eastern
Europe.°"
Both he and Prime Minister Schluter applauded Lithuania's
declaration of independence and urged Moscow to avoid threats and
pressure tactics, but they again rejected calls to establish
embassies or make "empty and ineffectual gestures.""8 Even prior
to the Soviet crackdown on Lithuanian deserters, however, the
intensity of the government's comments began to rise to Norwegian
levels. Calling for international condemnation, Prime Minister
Schluter described Soviet pressures as "completely improper and
""Norway Urges End to Embargo," New York Times, 20 April 90,
Al.
'Jorgen Flindt Pedersen, "Encourages Aid to Baltic Countries,"
Det Fri Aktuelt, 28 February 1990, 7, as cited in FBIS-WEU-90-042,
02 March 1990, 23.
0"Ole Dall, "Foreign Minister Denies 'Passivity' on Lithuania,"
Berlingske Tidende, 21 March 1990, 1, as cited in FBIS-WEU-90-057,
23 March 1990, 19.
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unacceptable."'87 He claimed that, small as Denmark is, someone had
to take the initiative.
87Per Lyngby, "Schluter Condemns Moscow Pressure on Lithuania,"
Berlinaske Tidende, 25 March 1990, 1, as cited by FBIS-WEU-90-061,
29 March 1990, 1.
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V. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE
To date, there has been very little academic debate over
the impact of the reemerging Baltic Question on long-term
European security. Further, no government has stepped forward
to propose publicly a comprehensive plan for fitting the
Baltic states into a future European security order. There
are several reasons for this lack of debate, one of which is
that human nature is inclined to be reactive rather than pro-
active. Undoubtedly, there are those who believe that, since
the Baltic republics are not yet independent--and may not be
for the foreseeable future--this is a bridge that does not yet
need crossing. Secondly, international attention has been
fixed on other issues. Dramatic developments in Eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Kuwait all have
overshadowed peaceful Baltic efforts.
A third reason is that many observers do not recognize the
uniqueness of the Baltic situation, and tend to blur
developments there into the larger debate over ethnic problems
in the Soviet Union. Finally, Western governments are not
openly proposing security arrangements that involve the three
republics, because they are reluctant to push President
Gorbachev too hard. They fear this could jeopardize other
gains, make the Kremlin stiffen its more accommodating foreign
54
J
policy, or even contribute to an uncontrolled collapse of the
entire Soviet system.
Europe stands at a crossroads, and it is impossible at
this point to forecast what form the next security arrangement
will take. Designing an entirely new, pan-European security
arrangement based on the European Community (EC), North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or some other plan is a
long-term proposition and merits an entirely separate study,
and is, therefore, beyond the scope of this paper. However,
the Baltic Question has the potential to force its way to the
top of the agenda in the very near term, so it is crucial,
nonetheless, to begin discussing the proper role for the
Baltic states. Their ultimate status must be carefully
crafted and satisfy the basic needs of all parties, if the
Baltic Question is to be truly resolved.
Accordingly, this chapter investigates alternative futures
that fall generally within existing frameworks, and attempts
to assess the impact of each on European security. With that
in mind, the discussion focuses first on a case in which
SeIn 1990, the Baltic states requested observer status in the
CSCE and asked for the Baltic Question to be put on its agenda, but
were turned down at least twice by mid-year. "Baltic Leaders Issue
Joint Communique," Sovetskava Estoniva, 15 May 1990, 1, as cited
in FBIS-SOV-90-120-S, 21 June 1990, 3-4. Also see: "CSCE Turns
Down Baltic Republics Again," Report on the USSR 2, no. 31 (03
August 1990): 25. In October 1990, Sweden and Norway expressed
their open support for observer status for the Baltic states. See:
"Sweden Supports Baltic Request," Report on the USSR 2, no. 43 (26
October 1990): 39.
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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania do not break away from the
Soviet Union. Next, the analysis concentrates on options
which feature independent Baltic countries. In broad terms,
the latter alternatives are non-alignment, neutrality, or
alignment.
A. REMAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION
Gorbachev clearly is dragging his feet on the Baltic
issue, hoping to create a new Union Treaty attractive enough
that the three republics will remain voluntarily. However,
Baltic leaders appear more determined than any other republic
to carry through with independence, and have refused to
participate in Union Treaty talks. In the unlikely event that
they offer to remain in the Soviet Union, the effect for
European security will be essentially status quo--there will
be no power vacuum, and the Soviet Union will continue to
dominate the Baltic Sea.
However, what might happen if the Baltic states continue
to demand total sovereignty and the Kremlin refuses to let go
also should be considered. Their movement has been
unfailingly peaceful thus far, but Moscow must be extremely
anxious as it considers current trends. At some point
(perhaps already), the Baltic states will cease to be an asset
and become, instead, a liability for the Kremlin.
This is a valid concern, for the Baltic states have never
been an entirely reliable corner of the empire. The Soviet
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annexation of the Baltics in 1940 immediately encountered both
active and passive resistance. Partisan groups, known as
"Forest Brothers," were very energetic in all three republics
during the immediate post-war years, with Lithuanians
conducting a guerrilla war that was not suppressed until
1952.89 Political dissent has continued in the years since
then, practically without interruption.9
Moscow attempted to overcome this opposition and to
integrate the three newly-won republics into the Soviet
defense forces. An experiment allowing ethnic groups to serve
in national or territorial military formations proved
unmanageable and was discontinued by 1956.91 At that time, the
Kremlin implemented a policy of "extraterritoriality," whereby
soldiers are stationed in ethnically heterogeneous units in
Military Districts far from their home regions.92 However,
this policy has been very unpopular and drew so much
89According to Misiunas and Taagepera (p. 277), up to 50,000
Lithuanian partisans were killed during their eight-year fight
against Soviet occupation. For additional discussion of the Baltic
resistance movement, see: V. Stanley Vardys, "The Partisan Movement
in Postwar Lithuania," in Lithuania Under the Soviets, ed. V.
Stanley Vardys (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965),
85-108, and K.V. Tauras (pseud.) Guerilla (sic) Warfare on the
Amber Coast (New York: Lithuanian Research Institute, 1962).
9Statistics compiled by David Kowalewski show that
Lithuanians, with approximately one percent of the USSR's
population, staged 10.3 percent of all Soviet demonstrations from
1965-78. See: V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuania's Catholic Movement
Reappraised," Survey 25, no. 3 (Summer 1980): 49.
91Trapans, 28-30.
92Alexiev and Wimbush, 11-14.
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resistance in 1989, that the Defense Ministry finally
succumbed to Baltic pressure, and now allows 25 percent of
non-Russian conscripts to serve in their home district (the
BMD). This "25 percent rule" was subsequently extended to
include other non-Russian republics.
93
However, even this concession has not slowed escalating
anti-military and anti-Moscow feelings. All three republics
have passed laws providing for "alternative service," and are
tolerating (if not encouraging) draft evasion movements like
"Geneva-49.9'9 Further, Estonia vdted in April to end all
military service in that republic, and Lithuania passed a law
in July creating a parallel, domestic draft.9
This does not mean the area will become chaotic if the
Kremlin thwarts Baltic secessionist efforts. Balts are, by
and large, very peaceful, and they appear to have drawn
lessons of non-violence from their post-war guerrilla
9Chief of General Staff Moiseev defends this decision by
claiming that without compromise, no one would be serving anywhere.
See: Kommunist vooruzhennvkh sil 2, 1990, 60, as cited in Stephen
Foye, "Rumblings in the Soviet Armed Forces," Report on the USSR
2, no. 11 (16 March 1990): 2.
94This group is named for the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which
states that citizens of occupied countries may not be forced to
serve in their occupier's army. Organized in October 1989, it
claimed in April 1990 to have registered more than 3,500 deserters
and draft evaders. See: Esther B. Fein, "Estonian Legislators Defy
Moscow by Voting to End Military Service," New York Times, 13 April
1990, Al.
9Esther B. Fein, "Estonian Legislators Defy Moscow," New York
Times, 13 April 1990, Al, and Bill Keller, "To Thwart Moscow's
Draft, Lithuania Prepares its Own," New York Times, 19 July 1990,
A6.
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experience. In fact, the only significant physical violence
to date has been committed by the Soviet army and anti-
independence minority groups. However, other forms of dissent
undoubtedly will continue to gain momentum and will be
coordinated to a greater degree than ever. Thus, the Baltic
republics will be a growing thorn in the side of the Kremlin
and will make "occupying" Soviet military forces feel
increasingly uncomfortable and anxious. Reports that nuclear
warheads are being pulled out of the area suggest that Moscow
takes the potential for crisis seriously. Further, turmoil
cannot be ruled out, particularly if Moscow believes its
interests are served by allowing the KGB of the Soviet army
to inflame tensions or provoke incidents. This would have an
immediate and negative impact on the security environment in
Europe.
With or without violence, then, the Baltic area may be
seen as an increasingly destabilizing influence on European
secuzity if the three republics are forced to remain in the
Union against their will. Repressing the Baltic Question will
no longer work; it must be brought into the open and resolved
"After denying these report for months, Chief of General Staff
Moiseev finally admitted that warheads have been withdrawn from
potential trouble spots. Though he refused to specify precise
areas, Western observers believe the moves include weapons in the
Baltics. See: "Nuclear Weapons Removed from Baltics," Washington
Times, 22 May 1990, 8, and John J. Fialka, "Soviets Begin Moving
Nuclear Warheads Out of Volatile Republics, Wall Street Journal,
22 June 1990, Al. For Moiseev's comments, see: Michael Dobbs,
"Putting Warheads Out of Harm's Way," Washinqton Post National
Weekly Edition, 08-14 October 1990, 16.
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to the satisfaction of all three states. Additionally, any
solution must be acceptable to Moscow, for Europe can never
be completely secure as long as the Soviet Union feels
insecure. In the end, settling the Baltic Question will
depend upon a delicate balancing of complex economic,
political, cultural, and security factors in each of the three
states, the Soviet Union, and their neighbors.
Having considered the implications of the Baltics
remaining "captive nations," it is time to consider how
independent Baltic countries might fit into the European
order. Again, the alternative futures fall under the general
headings of non-alignment, neutrality, and alignment.
B. NON-ALIGNMENT
"Non-alignment," a term coined by Prime Minister Nehru in
1954, was gradually fashioned by Egypt, India and Yugoslavia
into a movement embracing a political, military, and economics
position equidistant between the two superpowers.97 According
to J. W. Burton, non-alignment was meant to be a third
alternative, whereby nations could refuse peacetime alignment,
be "non-neutral," and "participate actively in world affairs
including certain aspects of the main [East-West) rivalry."
98
97Richard L. Jackson, The Non-AliQned. the UN and the
Superpowers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 6-15.
98J.W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 165. Chapters 9, 16,
18, and 19 offer a good explanation of the theory and evolution of
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Countries which participate in the non-aligned movement reject
the bi-polar, East-West international order, and feel little
sympathy with traditional Western notions of war prevention,
alliances, and balance of power. Burton notes that non-
aligned states participate in world councils to pass judgment
and promote change, which distinguishes them from neutrals,
who traditionally are somewhat more passive.100  In other
words, they attempt to stand outside of the East-West
confrontation, while working to influence the behavior and
policies of the major powers.
Most non-aligned states are located in Africa and Asia,
and they often have strong feelings of nationalism and anti-
colonialism.101  Typically, they are economically and
politically underdeveloped, militarily weak, and relatively
new to the international system. Additionally, many of them
have used non-alignment as a Cold War bargaining tool to
obtain badly-needed economic and technical assistance from
non-alignment.
9Curt Gasteyger, "The Neutrals, The Soviet Union and the
West," in The Missing Link, ed. R.E. Bissell and C. Gasteyger (Duke
University Press, 1990), 141.
100That Sweden has been quite vocal on some issues, such as its
criticism in the 1970s of U.S. actions in Vietnam, may be
explained, in part, by noting that its foreign policy calls for
"non-alignment in peace aiming at neutrality in war." Nils Andren,




both the East and West. 02 This could occur because, whereas
major powers want (and expect) neutrals to remain outside of
military conflicts, they view non-aligned nations as "fair
game" to be enticed into one of the two opposing camps.1
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A non-aligned status is possible for independent Baltic
states, but this thesis considers it highly unlikely, and no
Baltic leader has suggested it as an option. The model is
essentially a non-European one, yet the Baltic states identify
strongly with Europe in general and Norden in particular.
Further, the Baltic governments do not necessarily reject the
international order as it has existed for decades--they simply
want to change their place in it.
However, the best case against non-alignment as an
alternative is that, arguably, it is becoming an irrelevant
concept. As the East-West confrontation recedes into history,
there is (by definition) no longer an equidistant position to
occupy. Some features of non-alignment--such as the
flexibility and freedom from entangling political and military
alliances--may remain attractive to many countries, but
probably not to the Baltic states. History has shown that
for them to survive as independent nations, they will require
either an effective alliance system, or strong guarantees from
102John Spanier, Games Nations Play (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston/Praeger, 1978), 144-146.
103Burton notes (p. 220) that non-aligned countries would be
obliged in any war to declare themselves as either neutral or at
war.
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major powers or the international community. Therefore,
rather than seek a non-aligned status, it is more probable
that independent Baltic states will opt for neutrality or
alignment.
C. NEUTRALITY
Neutrality, a second alternative for independent Baltic
states, differs from non-alignment, though the two are often
thought to mean the same thing. Unlike non-alignment, which
is a status presently claimed by a majority of the worlds's
nations, neutrality is unattractive to all but a few. This
probably stems from the fact that neutrality offers less
flexibility, for it involves certain legal rights and
obligations, which are to be observed both by neutrals and
belligerents.
There are other differences as well. In the words of Curt
Gasteyger, "neutrality has its basis in international law and
deep roots of European history; nonalignment has its origins
in international politics as it was shaped by the East-West
conflict and the process of decolonization since 1945. '110 As
previously mentioned, he also contends that they differ in
their view of the existing international order; the former
rejects it and demands a new structure, whereas the latter is
generally more willing to work within it. Another scholar
104Gasteyger, 140.
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points out that neutrals must abstain from all armed
conflicts, whereas non-aligned countries feel compelled to
refrain only from conflicts involving the Cold War.
105
Although neutrality is based in international law and has
been an accepted status for centuries, interpretations of
exactly what it entails differ widely, even among established
neutral countries. However, there are some fundamentals which
appear common to most descriptions. Before discussing these,
one explanation is in order. This thesis will use the terms
"neutrality" and "neutralization" interchangeably though,
technically, there is a difference. Neutrality applies to
non-belligerency during armed hostilities, whereas
neutralization (sometimes called "permanent neutrality")
refers to conduct during peacetime as well.10 However, few
observers make the effort to distinguish between the two, and
most accounts and public discussion use the term "neutrality,"
when they actually mean "permanent neutrality"
(neutralization).
Most descriptions of neutrality appear to agree that its
purpose is "to preserve peace by means of special agreements
regarding states that are subjects of international
10Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement (London: Frances
Pinter, Ltd., 1978), 20.
10K.J. Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983), 102.
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controversy. 10 7 That is, a state being fought over and those
contesting it agree to a set of reciprocal obligations and
restrictions, with the expectation that this will remove that
country a source of conflict. This, in turn, will contribute
to international peace. Such an arrangement can be
accomplished through a negotiated agreement among great
powers. When it does, it often takes the form of a written
treaty, which either pledges compliance or offers guarantees
to assist the neutral state in preserving its status.
Neutralization can also be the result of a unilateral
declaration, made with the hope that other states will
recognize and honor this self-imposed commitment.
The rights and responsibilities associated with neutrality
are outlined in a variety of documents, including the 1907
Hague Convention. This is the aspect of neutrality which is
subjected to the greatest range of interpretation by the
international community.10 For their part, neutrals may not
use their armed forces for any purpose other than self-
defense. Further, they are enjoined from aiding any
belligerent by supplying arms or money, or by allowing their
territory to be used for training, basing, recruiting, or
107Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran R.
Young, Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press,1968), 18.
1 Rights and responsibilities mentioned here are drawn
primarily from Black, et al., and from Michael B. Akehurst, A
Modern Introduction to International Law (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1984), 241-242.
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foreign troop transportation. When perpetually neutral,
states must extend their impartiality to peacetime as well,
avoiding any ties which might circumscribe their freedom of
action or undermine their commitment to wartime neutrality.
10
They must not enter into military alliances and, depending
upon one's interpretation, may be precluded from joining
certain regional or global organizations. For example,
neutral states must not be party to collective security
arrangements or any treaties of guarantee, and should avoid
economic unions if such associations might jeopardize their
freedom of political choice.
In return, belligerents are expected to respect the
neutral's impartiality, and to refrain from violating its
territory or interfering with its commerce. Additionally,
they must not support activities by domestic revolutionaries
against the neutral's government. Guarantors, if there are
any, commit themselves to come to the aid of the neutral if
its status is violated. History has demonstrated that the
existence of one or more guarantors is no assurance that help
will be forthcoming as promised, but it does raise the
potential cost and may give aggressors pause when calculating
benefits to be derived by violating a state's neutral status.
10Harto Hakovirta, "East-West Tensions and Soviet Policies on
European Neutrality," in The Neutral Democracies and the New Cold
War, ed. B. Sunde.ius (Bolder: Westview Press, 1987), 209.
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It is clear that the success of a nation's neutrality
depends to a great extent upon balance of power interests
among major powers and guarantors, rather than upon the formal
mechanism itself. However, other factors also contribute to
the effectiveness or survivability of a nation as a neutral.
For example, Bissell and Gasteyger argue that physical size,
geography, population, cultural stability, and scale of
economy are all important (though not determining) factors.
110
Further, the neutral nation's ability to present a credible
defense will, in some cases, enhance its survivability. In
others, however, a less threatening military posture may be
more appropriate.
In her study of five nations who successfully maintained
neutrality in World War II, Annette Baker Fox reached several
additional conclusions. Among them, she found the chances for
survival as a small neutral increased when: the small state
was farther from a direct line between belligerents; the
aggressor felt a moral inhibition to the use of force; there
were massive physical barriers; the small state had been
independent for a long time; and when there were a greater
number of neutrals.
11I
110Richard E. Bissell and Curt Gasteyger, eds., The Missing
Link (Duke University Press, 1990), 4.
1
'IAnnette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States (University of
Chicago Press, 1959), 183-184.
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The point is, though arrangements among major powers may
carry the greatest weight with respect to the viability of a
state's neutrality, there are other influencing factors as
well. Therefore, it would be valuable to consider the
circumstances of Europe's present neutrals, to determine




Switzerland's self-ascribed neutrality not only has
a legal basis, it has withstood the test of time--it can be
traced to Middle Ages, and received formal international
recognition at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.112
Switzerland's geographical location is an important factor in
its ability to remain neutral. Warring powers (including both
sides in World Wars I and II) have often found it to their
advantage to have a stable, neutral buffer state in center of
Europe.113 As such, it has served as a constant that could be
planned around during periods of conflict or chaos.
112Lothar Ruehl, "NATO Strategy and the Neutrals," in The
Missing Link, ed. R.E. Bissell and C. Gasteyger (Duke University
Press, 1990), 116-117.
113This is not to say that Great Powers have not considered
violating Switzerland's neutrality from time to time (e.g., the
"Schlieffen Plan" in 1914 and "Operation Tannenbaum" in 1940.).
This is why other factors, such as topography, population, cultural
stability, and military strength are also important for neutral's
survival.
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Another important factor is that, as an armed
neutral, Switzerland is quite capable of defending its borders
and neutral status. Its mountainous terrain favors defense
and contributes to its lack of appeal to potential invaders.
Further, though it has no expansionist tendencies, neither is
it pacifistic. The Swiss are traditionally one of the most
military-oriented societies in Europe, and effective
participation in the militia remains an important factor in
an individual's ability to get ahead in civilian life. 114 As
a result of this popular commitment and a strong economy, the
Swiss have been able to maintain a defensive posture which is
highly regarded both internationally and domestically. This
has an important deterrence value.
In short, Swiss neutrality has become a fixed
feature in European diplomacy. It is well-accepted by the
international community at large and, more importantly, by the
major powers. It is a credible, stabilizing influence that
is grounded in international law.
It would be difficult to translate the Swiss
experience to the Baltic situation, however. Switzerland's
location, terrain, economy, and population all work to its
advantage. In contrast, the three Baltic states do not have
a long history of neutrality, and they occupy desirable
114Karl Haltiner, "Switzerland," in The Military: More Than
Just a Job?, ed. C.C. Moskos and F.R. Wood (Washington, DC:
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 257-259.
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territory that lies directly on the traditional invasion route
between Europe and the Soviet Union. Further, their flat
topography makes self-defense extremely difficult, and it is
doubtful that they have the funds, population, or inclination
to sustain large militaries. Therefore, Switzerland is
considered an ideal type, but an inappropriate model for the
Baltic states.
b. Sweden
Sweden is also a self-ascribed, armed neutral, but
it has no international guarantee. The country has avoided
war since 1814, and has claimed a policy of neutrality for
over 100 years.115 Like other Scandinavian countries, it is
extremely sensitive to maintaining the Nordic Balance
described earlier, and is considered by many to be its
fulcrum--Finland on one side and Norway-Denmark on the
other.116  Accordingly, its government strives to follow an
even-handed foreign policy and works to prevent any regional
instabilities which might invite action or interference by
outside powers.
There exists, within Sweden, a broad public
consensus for a non-provocative, yet total (military, civil,
115Bengt Sundelius, The Neutral Democracies and the New Cold
War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 5.
116Gunnar Jervas, "Sweden in a Less Benign Environment," in The
Neutral Democracies and the New Cold War, ed. B. Sundelius
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 65.
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economic, and psychological) defense, which is similar in many
regards to that in Switzerland.117  Its defense-industrial
complex is largely self-sufficient. Further, Sweden sees its
military as being important not only for domestic security,
but also as playing a strategic role in preserving the Nordic
Balance--it provides a very credible defense capability, that
guards against any perception of a power vacuum. Sweden's
status as a neutral is enhanced somewhat by its location,
positioned as it is below Norway's north cape and away from
a line between the Soviet Union and Europe.
Sweden's lack of an international guarantee, its
emphasis on military prowess and defensive self-sufficiency,
and its geographic location of f the main threat axis all
suggest that it, too, is inapplicable as a model for the
Baltic states. Further, its size and population
characteristics are much more favorable for maintaining
neutrality than is true in the Baltic case. Sweden is nearly
triple the combined area of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
and its homogeneous population is 8.4 million strong. The
Baltic states must add their populations together to come up
with a total of 8 million, and the results are far from
homogeneous. To begin, the three states are ethnically
different. Beyond that, matters have been made even worse by
'"William J. Taylor, Jr., "The Defense Policy of Sweden," in
The Defense Policies of Nations, ed. D.J. Murray and P.R. Viotti
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 300.
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the Soviet policies discussed earlier. Those Russification
programs have left each republic with large numbers of other
ethnic groups in their midst: non-natives make up 20 percent
of Lithuania's population, 39 percent of Estonia's, and an
overwhelming 48 percent of Latvia's. Because some of these
minorities are quite hostile to the idea of secession, the
Baltic house stands divided and, therefore, loses the
potential deterrence value which a strongly homogeneous state
enjoys.
The feature of the Swedish model which is most
applicable to the Baltic case is the aspect of a Nordic
community of interest. This could apply directly to the
Baltic situation, for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania identify
strongly with the Norden. A neutral status for the Balts




Switzerland's neighbor, Austria, is a relative new-
comer to the ranks of neutral countries. Its status is a
product of the East-West confrontation of the Cold War, even
"'
8The term "restricted" is used here only to distinguish
Austria and Finland, whose military capabilities are limited by
international agreement, from the unrestricted, heavily-armed
neutrality of Switzerland and Sweden.
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though accomplished by a unilateral legislative act.
119
Austria's neutrality is not guaranteed by outside signatory
powers, but it is recognized and has proved quite stable since
1955. This has happened, in large part, because it has been
in the interest of the opposing bipolar blocs. Neutrality was
seen by both the East and West as way of denying each other
control over Austria after the war, and that perception has
continued through the present.
Austria does not practice ideological, economic or
political "neutralism" (as Switzerland often does), but it
does intend to remain nonpartisan in any future military
conflicts. Domestically, it employs a strategic concept of
area defense, which is designed to deter outside aggression
by making incursions too costly to be worthwhile. 120 However,
restrictions on its military that were written into the 1955
treaty reduce Austria's deterrence credibility, compared to
that of Switzerland or Sweden.
Like the two models just examined, it appears that
Austrian neutrality would not lend itself well to the Baltic
situation. Austria became neutral as part of an East-West
119Its neutrality was not embodied in the May 1955 State
Treaty, as is sometimes assumed. Rather, it was set forth in an
October 1955 law as a quid pro auo for Soviet acceptance of the
treaty. See: Richard A. Bitzinger, Neutrality for Eastern Europe?
An Examination of Possible Western Models (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 1990), 7-10.
120Heinz Vetshera, "Austria," in The Missing Link, ed. R.E.
Bissell and C. Gasteyger (Duke University Press, 1990), 67.
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zero-sum game--it was a way of avoiding a strategic gain or
loss by either side. The Baltic states already are "members"
of one side. Additionally, Austria has been able to maintain
its status without a guarantee, largely because of special
bipolar circumstances and an ability to establish itself as
a bridge between East and West.121 History has demonstrated
that the Baltic states cannot survive without an international
guarantee (sometimes, even with one) or the backing of a major
power. Unfortunately, the country in the best position to
offer moral and physical support--the Soviet Union--is the
very one that is oppressing them. One feature that may apply
to the Baltic states is that of having military restrictions
(e.g., a ban on weapons over a certain range) placed upon
them. Such conditions might alleviate any Soviet worries that
the Baltic states would pose a military threat.
b. Finland
Finland, like Austria, became a neutral state
relatively recently. It attempted to neutralize itself in
1939, but that effort was smashed when the Soviet army invaded
during the Winter War of 1939-40. After World War II ended,
Finland ensured its survival and Soviet predominance by
quietly relinquishing most of Karelia, as well as other
121These conditions are now disappearing, and many Europeans
are pressing for a "common European house" concept. Such
circumstances will test Austria's self-imposed commitment to
neutrai. ty.
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territory along the Finnish-Soviet border.122 By the Finnish
Peace Treaty signed in Paris in 1947, the government agreed
not to allow any local organizations to engage in hostile
anti-Soviet propaganda. Further, the treaty placed limits
on the size and types of Finnish armed forces and military
hardware.
Finland also signed a Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviets in 1948,
pledging to "fight aggression against the Soviet Union on
Finnish territory [emphasis added] with all her military
forces if the Soviet Union is attacked by Germany or any other
country allied with Germany.''124  While this may seem a
violation of the principles of neutrality, Finns claim that
it is not necessarily so. This treaty applies only to
aggression on Finnish soil. Finland is not obligated to come
to the aid of the Soviet Union if the threat comes from some
other direction. In effect, the Finns are saying they will
defend their own territory against outside aggression.
Further, Moscow recognized Finland's right to a neutral status
in the preamble and Article One of the treaty, and it did not
122A total of 13 percent of Finland's territory was surrendered
to the USSR. See: Bitzinger, 10-14.
123Trond Gilberg, "Finland," in Nordic Defense: Comparative
Decision MakinQ, ed. W.J. Taylor, Jr., and P.M. Cole (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1985), 38.
124Ruehl, 117-118.
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prevent the Finns from joining the United Nations and Nordic
Council in 1955.125
As result of the war and the 1947 and 1948
agreements, Moscow achieved practically everything it wanted.
It refrained from making further demands, so as to avoid
pushing Sweden into NATO. Therefore, the Kremlin has been
generally supportive of Finland's "neutrality" within the
bounds of their established agreements.
Though Finland is classified as neutral, its
liberal interpretation of rights and responsibilities clearly
make it a special, very flexible form of neutrality.126 For
example, it is common for Finnish leaders to consult with the
Kremlin on important foreign policy matters.127 Additionally,
provisions of the 1947 and 1948 treaties allow the Kremlin to
exert a degree of legal power over Finland. It might be
argued that, by extension, this gives the Kremlin a measure
of leverage over the Nordic Council and a way of influencing
the Nordic Balance.
125Bo Petersson points out that, while the legal basis of
Finnish neutrality is contained in the 1948 Treaty, most analysts
view the 1955 return of the Porkkala naval base by the Soviets as
the real beginning of Finland's neutrality. See: "From Avoiding
the Subject to Outright Criticism," Nordic Journal of Soviet and
East European Studies 4, no. 1 (1987): 50.
126AS Bitzinger (p. 11) has noted, this flexibility stems from
Finnish President Paasikivi's realolitik assertion during the
1940s--and supported by most other Finns--that "the beginning of
all wisdom is the recognition of facts."
127Gilberg, 38.
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There are many features of the Finland model that
do not apply well to the Baltic case. Finland's size (twice
as large as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia combined), rugged
terrain, and location beside a significant regional power--
Sweden--all work to its advantage. Additionally, Helsinki
fields a military which, though restricted by international
agreement, has earned the respect of the Soviets and enhances
its neutral status.
Nonetheless, Finland's brand of flexible neutrality
may well provide the best example for independent Baltic
countries. Like Finland, the Baltic states suffer from
geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, and so also face
certain "realities." Unless they can solicit strong, credible
guarantees from other major powers, their situation dictates
that they refrain from actions or policies which might unduly
antagonize the Soviet Union. Thus, a neutral status biased
in favor of the USSR might meet Baltic needs, yet also give
Moscow an acceptable level of security, in the event that it
feels compelled to grant them independence.
3. The Baltic States, Moscow, and Neutrality
Given their need to remain flexible while negotiating
for independence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been
understandably vague with regard to their ultimate security
status. They sometimes have acknowledged a willingness to
offer defense concessions to the Soviets but, on other
77
occasions, have stated a firm intention to become neutral and
free of nuclear weapons.
128
Neutrality failed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in
1940 for several reasons. Clearly, arrangements among great
powers was the major cause. They faced two very aggressive,
expansionist countries, who were determined to annex them.
Other great powers simply looked away, which sealed the Baltic
countries' fate.
But there were other reasons, too. All three Baltic
countries fell short in areas which enhance the chances of
sustaining neutrality, such as size, population, scale of
economy, resources, and technical sophistication. They proved
incapable of individually generating an effective self-
defense, and found little support in the international
community-at-large or in the impotent League of Nations.
Still, their ability to survive would have been greatly
enhanced had they overcome personal jealousies and petty
ambitions and cooperated effectively as a regional group. In
Edgar Anderson's words, they "wasted twenty valuable years
without establishing themselves as a respectable buffer zone,
12See, for example: Randall Mikkelsen, "Baltic Republics
Should Be Neutral, Senior Officials Say," Reuter Library Report,
22 May 1990. Even before losing Lithuania's February elections,
Communist Party chief Brazauskas was calling for "permanent
neutrality." See: Susan Cornwell, "Lithuanian Leader Calls for
Creation of Neutral State," Reuter Library Report, 19 February
1990.
78
as was expected of them."'12 The three could not even agree on
which country presented the greatest threat--Estonia was most
apprehensive about the Soviet Union, while Latvia and
Lithuania feared aggression from Poland and Germany. Efforts
to strengthen the Entente and work together seriously were
undertaken too late.
By reviving the 1934 Entente in 1990 and coordinating
closely on a wide range of issues, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania may finally be engaging in the type of collaboration
that Anderson found so lacking and which would contribute to
their survivability as neutrals.130 If they combine effective
inter-state cooperation with the realistic flexibility of the
Finns--and if Moscow maintains positive intentions--neutrality
could be a more viable option for the future.
Might the Kremlin support neutrality for independent
Baltic countries? According to Peter Vigor, Soviet leaders
of the 1920-30s were suspicious of the mere idea of
neutrality, because it did not mesh with Marxist dialectics.
131
However, they slowly came to acknowledge that a country could
be "perpetually neutral" if it does not participate in wars
or military alliances, does not allow foreign troops to store
1nAnderson, 135.
130For a good overview of recent cooperative efforts, see:
Nils Muiznieks, "The Evolution of Baltic Cooperation," Report on
the USSR 2, no. 27 (06 July 1990): 18-20.
131Peter H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War. Peace and Neutrality
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 178-180.
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equipment or be based on its territory, and does not equip its
forces with nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1950s, the
Kremlin actually began to advocate neutrality to small West
European countries as a way of strengthening the world peace
zone. 132
In short, the Soviet position on neutrality has
"matured" over the years and has become more tolerant.
Because of the many overwhelming problems currently facing the
Soviet Union, and because the Baltic states appear bent on
seceding, neutrality may be more palatable than ever before.
If Moscow decides its interests are best served by backing
neutrality for independent Baltic countries, it is easy to
predict which model it would prefer. Whenever the Kremlin has
commented positively on the subject of neutrality through the
years, it has been most supportive of the Finnish example.
133
Soviet leaders have recommended it to Norway on many
occasions, and claim it is particularly suited to the Nordic
region.13
Moscow's approbation should come as no surprise, for
at least two reasons. First, Finland's system has allowed
132Hakovirta, 205.
133Soviet leaders have frequently hailed Finland as a model
neighbor, a theme reiterated by Gorbachev when he visited Helsinki
in October 1989. See: Bill Keller, "Gorbachev, in Finland,




Moscow an influential voice in its foreign and domestic
policies. Secondly, as a result of the 1947 Paris Peace
Treaty and prudent thinking, Finland has developed a military
that is adequate for defense, but not so strong as to present
the Kremlin with a worrisome threat. These "concessions" to
win Soviet acceptance have helped ensure Finland's survival
as a neutral country, and Baltic governments and the
architects of a new European security paradigm would do well
to examine carefully the key features of this model.
4. Cordon Sanitaire
Related to the idea of Baltic neutrality is the notion
of a cordon sanitaire--a corridor of neutral states stretching
through Europe from north to south. Originally intended as
a way of halting the estward spread of Bolshevism, the
concept gradually came to mean a buffer system designed to
separate potentially aggressive powers. Many variations were
advanced during the inter-war years, in the hopes of
establishing a strategic cushion between Germany and the
Soviet Union. One version, proposed several times by French
Foreign Minister Briand, involved Finland, the three Baltic
countries, and Poland.135  For several reasons, however,
nothing came of his or similar proposals. First, the Polish-
135Alexander Dallin, "The Baltic States Between Nazi Germany
and Soviet Russia," in The Baltic States in Peace and War, ed. V.S.




Lithuanian dispute continued to sour relations between all
three Baltic governments and Warsaw. Secondly, there was a
general reluctance on the part of Nordic countries to get
involved in any military alliance system. Finally, neither
France nor the Great Britain were prepared or equipped to
guarantee such an arrangement.
In 1990, two plans for a future European framework
have resurrected the idea of a cordon sanitaire. Michael
Howard proposes a corridor "politically independent and free
of all foreign military forces" extending from Finland through
the Baltics, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria and
Yugoslavia.13 He believes this arrangement would satisfy the
security requirements of both the Soviet Union and the Western
Alliance. Two other military analysts recommend a "defensive
military zone" composed of Finland, the Baltics, Poland, a
unified Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria.137 They
contend such an arrangement would enhance European security
and allow NATO and the Warsaw Pact to exist with reduced
offensive forces.
These plans (both proposed prior to the unification of
East and West Germany) have merit, first, because they
contribute to the debate on a new security order for Europe,
'
3Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," Survival 32, no.
2 (March/April 1990): 103.
137Ralph Earle and Thomas Robertson, "Defensive Plan for
European Security," San Francisco Chronicle, 02 May 1990, Z1.
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and second, because they relate to resolution of the Baltic
security question. However, they also have some notable
weaknesses. First, they perpetuate the Cold War paradigm of
a hostile East-West rivalry, rather than seeking to integrate
the two sides. Secondly, both plans would force countries
which are eager to join a new European order on an equal,
unencumbered basis to fit, instead, into a restrictive
category. Finally, these proposals look good on a map, but
do not necessarily take individual countries and cultures into
consideration. For example, Poland, which historically has
maintained large armies and sought security through alliances
and bilateral treaties, probably would decline to participate
in such an arrangement. Instead, its leaders are promoting
the idea of maintaining NATO and the Warsaw Pact until an all-
European security structure can become a reality.138
D. ALIGNED STATUS
The third broad alternative for independent Baltic states
is alignment with another country or group of countries. It
would be an understatement to say there is little chance that
Moscow would permit the Baltic states to join NATO. The only
way that might occur would be if Moscow also joined the
alliance, or if the Soviet Union totally disintegrated.
13See, for example: Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Poland and the
Soviet Alliance System," Report on Eastern Europe 1, no. 26 (29
June 1990): 30-32.
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However, unless NATO is transformed into an all-European
system, it appears that the organization is not prepared to
accept new members in the near term.139  Other existing
organizations, such as the Western European Union, also show
no signs of a readiness to expand their membership.
However, three other alignment options should be
considered. The first is military alliance with the Soviet
Union, or its former republics, in the event that the Union
fractures. The other two would be the establishment of a
Nordic alliance or an alliance with Poland.
1. Alignment with the USSR or Former Republics
Moscow's first choice is to keep the Baltic republics
in the Union and, as previously observed, it appears that the
current strategy is to delay secessionists until a new,
attractive federation can be created. However, if political
or economic exigencies make it necessary to grant independence
to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, it is reasonable to expect
that the Kremlin's fall-back position will be to extract
concessions designed to guarantee Soviet national security.
139Communiques from North Atlantic Council meetings in June and
July 1990 invited former East Bloc nations to establish regular
diplomatic liaisons with NATO, and discussed the need to redefine
NATO's role and goals, but they did not suggest expanding its
membership. Instead, NATO leaders reiterated their desire to
maintain the organization as a defensive alliance and called for
CSCE to become more prominent in Europe's future. See: "London
Declaration," and "NAC Final Communique," NATO's Sixteen Nations
35, no. 4 (July/August 1990): 66-70.
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Moscow's most likely negotiated demand would be Baltic
membership in the Warsaw Pact, or a bilateral military
alignment with the Soviet Union. Accepting this demand is
within the realm of possibility, because the Baltic states do
not object to Soviet defense or protection per se. Their main
complaint is their lack of sovereign free choice, though they
do chafe over certain Soviet military policies, such as
extraterritorial stationing and hazing of conscripts.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania want independence, dignity, and
the freedom to set their own national agendas. Future
political, economic, or military associations with their
former "oppressor" would pose no inconsistency, as long as
they are entered into voluntarily. Already, President
Landsbergis has raised publicly the possibility of a sovereign
Lithuania joining the Warsaw Pact. 14  Such an alignment
certainly would not be the Baltic states' first choice, and
there is some question as to how effective such an alliance
would be, given broken treaties of the past and currently
inflamed nationalist tensions. However, President Landsbergis
has stated that Balts have no desire for revenge and believes
past differences can be overcome.141 In any case, the Baltic
140"Situation in Lithuania," Report on the USSR 2, no. 25 (22
June 1990): 26.
141Landsbergis contends that Soviet peoples were all victims
of a cruel system, which now is being destroyed. See: "Small
States May Recognize Lithuania First, President Says," Reuter
Library ReDort, 24 August 1990.
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governments might opt for even an imperfect solution, if it
means gaining their independence.
Failing a formal military alignment between the Baltic
states and Moscow, Soviet negotiators could be expected to
press for Baltic treaties similar to the 1948 pact with
Finland. Additionally, they probably would seek to obtain
special arrangements permitting some level of Soviet troop
presence, access to airfields and naval facilities, and
perhaps retention of key radar installations and electronics
surveillance posts. These types of demands also might be
acceptable to Baltic leaders. Algis Cekuolis, a Landsbergis
spokesman, has stated openly that Lithuania might "recognize
Soviet 'interests'--but not 'rights'--in the Baltic states,
maybe including a military presence, together with access to
the city of Kaliningrad...and use of the Baltic ports. ',142
What about political, economic, or military alliances
with former Soviet republics, if disintegration occurs as has
been predicted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Z," and others? 143
Certainly, some types of arrangements are possible (if not
probable), for it is in the Baltic states' interest to have
close, friendly links with as many neighbors as they can. The
connections that Baltic leaders have cultivated with
142John Lloyd, "Lithuania Outlines Stance on Talks," Financial
Times (London), 05 April 1990, 2.
143 See: Brzezinski, 1-25, and "Z" (Martin Malia), "To the
Stalin Mausoleum," Daedalus 119, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 295-344.
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nationalist groups in the Ukraine (Rukh), Belorussia (Popular
Front), and Moldavia, and their increasing political and
economic ties with Russian President Boris Yeltsin demonstrate




However, it should be pointed out, again, that the
three Baltic states want most of all to integrate into the
Euro-Nordic community. Therefore, one can expect that Baltic
leaders will avoid entering into any agreements--particularly
military pacts--which could jeopardize that goal. There is
potentially one major complication. Russia, traditionally the
driving force behind the Soviet Union, could force changes to
that strategy. Of all the Union republics, Russia is the most
likely to attempt to step into the superpower vacancy created
by a disintegrated Soviet Union. If it believed large-scale
access to the Baltic Sea would contribute to that end, Russia
could be a persistent suitor or even a threat. Currently,
there are no indications this will occur, but if it did, the
Baltic states might feel compelled to draw closer to Moscow
than they otherwise would have preferred.
1
"Perhaps the single-most significant reason why Moscow
terminated its economic boycott of Lithuania was that Yeltsin
refused to uphold it. A bilateral trade agreement for 1991 was
concluded between the Russian republic and Lithuania in August
1990. See: "Pilateral Trade Agreements Signed Between Republics,"
ReDort on the USSR 2, no. 34 (24 August 1990): 32.
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2. Nordic Alliance
The discussion in Chapter IV demonstrated that a good
deal of Western Europe's reaction to events in the Baltics has
been less than encouraging for the secessionists. While
publics there have been largely supportive, their governments
have been vague and cautious. French, German, and British
officials have followed the American response of expressing
sympathy, urging talks, and stating that recognition will come
only after Baltic governments have effective control over
their territory.
Norden, on the other hand, has been very supportive,
and the five countries feel historical cultural, economic, and
political connection with the Balts.145 In the recent years,
contacts between Nordic countries and the Baltic states have
increased markedly, and Scandinavian diplomats have suggested
to Phillip Peterson (an official in the U.S. Office of the
Secretary of Defense) that the Nordic Council would be willing
to accept the three Baltic states as members.16
145The Nordic countries feel the strongest affinity toward
Estonia and Latvia. They sometimes view Lithuania as foreign,
because of its Polish tradition and Catholic religion. Still,
there is an attraction, and Nordic states appear more interested
than other European nations in finding a niche for Lithuania.
Further, it is on those countries that Lithuanian delegations have
concentrated much of their attention and diplomatic efforts in
1990. See Alain Debove, "Querelles de Voisinage," Le Monde, 05
January 1990, 5, for a discussion of the views of Scandinavians
toward Lithuania.
14Phillip A. Peterson, "A New Security Regime for Europe?"
Problems of Communism 39, no. 2 (March-April 1990): 97. Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, and Iceland formed the Nordic Council in 1953 to
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Peterson has formulated a vision of Europe in the year
2000 which features three groupings of nations--a West
European confederation, a middle European group, and a Nordic
group. In the latter, he includes the three Baltic states.
Although his plan is based on a premise that the Soviet Union
will disintegrate, his inclusion of the Baltic states in a
Nordic grouping is an idea that could hold promise even if the
Soviet Union remains essentially intact. Along similar lines,
Former British Foreign Secretary David Owen has proposed that
the three Baltic republics be freed and then join with
Finland, Sweden, and Norway to form a six-nation Baltic group
linked to the European Community.147 Owen believes this would
help the Baltic states make an easier transition to a Western-
style economy and political structure.
The type of federated alliance suggested above is
based primarily upon economic, political, and cultural
interests, and conceivably could help balance the anticipated
economic and political power of a reunited Germany. It would
also help to stabilize economic conditions in the region, and
offer Moscow a bridge to Scandinavian markets and assistance.
All this would contribute to regional stability and, in turn,
coordinate Scandinavian economic and cultural interests. Finland
joined two years later.
147
"Nordic Key to Independence," Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Daily Report, no. 179, 19 September 1990.
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would be beneficial to all parties concerned with European
security.
This Nordic model of alliance also could have long-
range security implications. As Peterson has observed, in the
future, "international security will increasingly depend upon
economic relationships. ''118 It is not unrealistic, therefore,
to imagine that the Nordic Council could increasingly come to
address defense issues, particularly depending on the outcome
of a new, all-European security plan. In the meantime,
though, it is conceivable that the Baltic states could follow
one track for military security (e.g., alignment with Moscow,
or guaranteed neutrality), and a Nordic track for political,
economic, and cultural matters.
Moscow's current position on the concept of an
augmented Nordic community--particularly one with potential
defense responsibilities--is uncertain. In the 1930s, the
Kremlin welcomed Nordic cooperation and stability, but did not
want it to develop into a military defense alliance or become
a coordinated neutral bloc. 149 It took the same position in
1948, when Sweden proposed the establishment of a neutral
Scandinavian defense alliance to offset the advances that the
18Peterson, 18.
1491ngemar Lindahl, The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-
Weaoons-Free-Zone Proposal (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd, 1988),
15.
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Kremlin was making toward Finland and that the West was making
toward Norway and Denmark.
150
At present, Moscow's emphasis appears to favor
creation of an all-European security system, preferably based
on the CSCE process. However, if it feels compelled to grant
Baltic independence and sees no sign of a CSCE solution, it
might view a Nordic alliance as the next best alternative.
This would be particularly tempting if it helped to further
neutralize already conditional (some would say lukewarm)
Norwegian and Danish support for NATO, and if it led in the
direction of Moscow's long-standing desire for a "permanent
peace zone. ''151 Even without that occurring, however, Moscow
understands that its "special" relationship with Finland--
combined with the delicate nature of the Nordic Balance--
would allow it to exert some degree of leverage over the
group.152 Further, the Nordic states have proven themselves to
be a very peaceful, steady group, bound by a strong community
of interests. Melding the Baltic states safely into the
Nordic fraternity would bring stability to the Soviet Union's
150Lindahl, 20.
151For a discussion of the Kremlin's traditional hopes for a
Nordic peace zone, see: Brent Jensen, "The Soviet Union and
Scandinavia: Status Quo or Revision?" Nordic Journal of Soviet and
Eastern European Studies 4, no. 1 (1987): 5-13.
152It should be noted, however, that many Finnish scholars and
politicians believe the 1948 treaty has outlived its usefulness and
should be reexamined and possibly discarded. See: Tony Austin,
"Finland Cautiously Reexamines its Soviet Policy," Reuter Library
Report, 26 May 1990.
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western border, and allow the Kremlin to concentrate cn
instabilities in other parts of the Union.
3. Polish Alliance
A third possibility--political or military alignment
with Poland--merits consideration. Poland feels an historical
kinship with Lithuania and, as previously discussed, its
support in 1990 for Lithuanian secession has been strong.
However, President Landsbergis and his government have not
attempted to expand this relationship significantly. Instead,
Lithuania seems determined to coordinate its efforts with
Estonia and Latvia, and those republics feel closest to
Norden. For their part, the five Nordic countries have never
felt a sense of community with Poland, nor have they
considered it to be part of the Nordic Balance.
The idea of a Baltic alliance with Poland, then,
appears to apply almost solely to Lithuania. As a result, it
should be viewed primarily as a final card to be played in the
event that Lithuania becomes the only Baltic republic to break
free and is unable to work its way into the Nordic community.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate that the
reappearance of the Baltic Question has definite implications
for European security--implications that demand attention as
the rigid, bipolar Cold War order evolves into a new security
arrangement. In order to explain the problem properly and
determine the effects of various alternatives for the future,
this thesis considered both historical precedent and
contemporary constraints. As a result of that process,
several conclusions may be drawn.
A. BALTIC STATES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
First, it should be evident that the Baltic nations have
affected Europe's security, both as independent states and as
captive nations. Estonia and Latvia have been fought over
repeatedly and, being unable to conduct an effective self-
defense, have spent most of their histories under the
domination of other states. Lithuania stood as a great power
and occasional aggressor for centuries, but it too eventually
fell prey to an imperialistic neighbor. These developments
were disruptive for obvious reasons. They frustrated the
Balts, who wanted to rule themselves, yet were forced to
adjust to a succession of rulers. They contributed to
instability in Europe, because each gain or loss of the three
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states affected the relative balance among the contending
great powers. Additionally, these events soured the overall
European security environment in much the same way that Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait has affected the mood in the Middle East.
In recent years, the Baltic states' status as captive to the
Soviet Union has been relatively stable, in that there have
been no internal rebellions or attempts by other nations to
wrest control of the region away from the Soviets. However,
even this has been a threatening situation, because Western
Europeans have viewed the area apprehensively as the
springboard for a potential Warsaw Pact invasion.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania also affected European
security as independent countries. Most recently, the three
attempted in the 1920-30s to establish themselves as
responsible, sovereign members of the international community,
initially with positive results. However, the reality was
that they were surrounded by nations who had designs on their
territory and, in the end, Moscow prevailed over all
contenders. The Baltic countries clearly had been victimized
but, in a sense, they also had contributed to the region's
instability. Their inability to defend their neutrality or
to overcome regional jealousies and develop an effective
alliance system made them an inviting target to the Soviet
Union, Germany and, to a lesser degree, also to Poland.
A second conclusion is that the fate and defense of the
Baltic states typically have depended more on arrangements
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among the great powers than on the efforts of their own
governments. Furthermore, it is quite possible that this
pattern will continue into the future--for the Baltic states
to survive as sovereign states, it is imperative that they
obtain the support or unfailing acceptance of the major
powers, particularly that of the Soviet Union.
The events of 1940 illustrate this point. Neither the
Soviet Union nor Germany respected the sovereignty of the
Baltic states, and neither could restrain its own urge to
expand. At the same time, other major powers--most notably
Great Britain and France--opted not to extend a guarantee oi
safety, and the three nations soon lost their independence.
It was not that these other powers bore the Baltic states any
ill will. They simply had wider interests and different
priorities, and were unwilling to jeopardize their broader
agendas to protect Baltic independence. They wanted the
Baltic states to be sovereign and a part of the European
order, but they also wanted the region to be secure and
preferred that security flow from a regional alliance with
Poland or the Scandinavian countries. That is to say, the
other major powers hoped for a regionql solution to a problem
which had much wider balance of power implications.
Understandably, however, Baltic leaders felt that by its
inaction, the West had sold them out.
In her study of power and small states, Annette Baker Fox
explores this type of dilemma, noting that "while the great
95
power might be almost the whole concern of the small state,
the latter was only a small part of the concern of the great
power."153  Sometimes great power attention (or lack of it)
works in favor of the small power, sometimes it works against
it. Unfortunately for the Balts, their survival depended upon
the Great Powers, and those countries elected not to
intervene. This was true in 1940, and it clearly is happening
in 1990 as well--no country has stepped forward to confront
Moscow on the issue, for fear of jeopardizing other "big-
picture" issues.
In short, the Baltic states are an important component in
the European security equation--they a~t on the system, and
it acts upon them--but historically, they have been relegated
to a position of secondary importance. Nonetheless, they are
an important factor, and it would be wise to resolve the
Baltic Question now, while other European security issues are
being settled. For Europe to be stable and secure, all of its
parts must feel relatively secure. In the case of the Baltic
states, this will just require extra cooperation and
guarantees from the international community.
B. BALTIC STATES AND SOVIET SECURITY
As just noted, all nations must feel relatively secure,
but this is especially important when considering a major,
153Fox, 181.
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nuclear power such as the Soviet Union. The international
community is well aware of this fact, as evidenced by the
generally cautious stand most governments adopted following
Lithuania's 11 March 1990 declaration of independence.
The Russian empire and Soviet Union have had a long
history of being invaded through the Baltic region. Coupled
with their own expansionist tendencies, that concern has made
Soviet-Russian advances toward the Baltic states the most
persistent and aggressive ones through the centuries.
Therefore, it would not be overstating the case to say that
the Kremlin holds the key to the Baltic future. The past
provides good reason to believe that if Moscow threw its
unqualified support to independent Baltic states, they could
survive. Conversely, it suggests that the future does not
look as bright if the Soviet Union begrudges their
independence and the Baltic governments continue to press
their case.
This study demonstrated that, after violating the letter
and spirit of numerous commitments and treaties, Moscow
carefully integrated Estonia, Latvia, aid Lithuania into its
national security plan. The Baltic republics now contain an
extensive network of military bases, airfields, listening
posts, as well as stockpiles of military equipment, artillery,
bridging equipment, oil, and nuclear weapons.
However, it is also the position of this paper that from
a security standpoint, the loss of the Baltic republics is
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manageable. It would be expensive, and the High Command would
be very unhappy, but Soviet defense strategists could adapt,
particularly given Moscow's well-publicized shift to a
strictly defensive doctrine. Kaliningrad and Leningrad would
continue to provide access to the Baltic Sea, and there are
indications that the Baltic states are willing to offer
concessions to help safeguard Soviet security and ease
anxieties. It might even be argued that Baltic independence
would be a good opportunity for the Soviet Union finally to
acquire a protective layer of "Finlandized" buffer states,
such as it initially sought to create after World War II.
In the end, the Kremlin must make its decision by wuighing
security gains and losses against many complex political,
economic, and cultural factors at not only the regional level,
but the national and international levels as well. This
process must include a careful assessment of the value of
keeping in the Union what Moscow undoubtedly sees as
increasingly troublesome and unreliable Balts--that is, a
calculation of the point at which they represent more of a
liability than an asset. Moscow must also consider the
precedent this would set for other restive republics, as well
as what effect loss of the Baltic states would have on the
overall correlation of forces. As secessionist and anti-
military sentiments rise inside the Soviet Union, and as
former allies turn in other directions, Soviet feelings of
insecurity also will rise. It is worth repeating once again,
98
then, that since it is in Europe's best interest for the USSR
to feel reasonably secure, any attempt to resolve the Baltic
Question must be designed to enhance Moscow's confidence in
its ability to protect itself.
C. ALTERNATIVES
Forecasting the future is always risky business, and it
is especially chancy now, in view of the dramatic rate and
scope of change during 1989-90. The fact that governments and
academia are offering practically no public debate over future
roles for the Baltic states only adds to the problem.
Rather than argue a specific vision for the future, this
thesis explored four broad ways that the Baltic Question might
be resolved, and considered the effects of each. It
discounted non-alignment, but found three others--remaining
in the Soviet Union, neutrality, and alignment--to be
realistic alternatives. The first option could occur either
as the result of a crack-down or by a change of heart on the
part of Baltic leaders. A brutal repression would leave
smoldering resentment and possibly increasing resistance in
the area, and thus would be undesirable from the point of view
of Balts, Soviets, and Europeans alike.154  A voluntary
decision to remain in the Union would stabilize the region and
would essentially settle the Baltic Question, which are
154It also could push East Europeans closer to NATO, which
probably would be viewed with discomfort in the Kremlin.
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important points in its favor. However, it also would leave
the Soviets in their forward-leaning position, which would be
detrimental to European security if Moscow chose to reverse
its currently accommodating foreign policy and return to its
previously aggressive ways.
The second category, that of neutral, independent
countries, could also occur, but only under the proper
conditions. As was shown, the Baltic states are lacking in
many attributes (e.g., size, population, economy, resources,
and technology) that improve a neutral's survivability. They
also lie along the traditional invasion route between Europe
and Moscow.
However, all three Baltic states have expressed an
interest in resuring a neutral status, and it can be argued
that these problems could be overcome if Moscow (historically
the Baltic states' greatest antagonist) would be supportive.
There is good reason to believe that a Finnish-style
neutrality--flexible and militarily restricted--could meet the
needs and desires of both sides. Again, though, the only way
neutrality will work is if Moscow is supportive, or if one or
more other major powers agree to guarantee the Baltic states.
Even a fully-functioning neutral bloc of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania would probably require major power backing in order
to be credible. It is possible that such a guarantee could
be provided by a new, all-European security system, if one
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ever evolves. Ultimately, however, it is best if the Balts
work out their differences with Moscow.
The third alternative future which was investigated is
alignment, either with the Soviet Union, Norden, or Poland.
Baltic leaders already have hinted that joining the Warsaw
Pact (as well as offering basing concessions for Soviet
forces) is a possibility, because their drive for secession
is not so much anti-Soviet as it is pro-independence and pro-
equality. If this occurred, the Soviet Union would retain
some ability to lean forward toward Europe. HowF-Ter, this
would be less of a problem for European security than in the
past, for at least two reasons. First, the Baltic states
could be expected to demand an overall smaller military
presence on their territories, and they would want this
presence to be composed primarily of indigenous forces.
Secondly, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania see their future as
lying with the West, so they undoubtedly would temper any
attempt by the Soviets to make Baltic territory threatening
to Europe.
In the event that the Soviet Union totally disintegrated,
it is possible that Russia might seek out world recognition
as the successor superpower. While the Baltic states prefer
to look westward for their place in the international order,
they might feel forced, in these circumstances, to consider
some form of alignment with Russia in recognition of the fact
that it would pose the greatest potential threat to their
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sovereignty. If this occurred, the effect on European
security would be similar to a Baltic alliance with the Soviet
Uni.on. If Russia did not pose a threat, some types of
political, economic, or military arrangements might be entered
into between the Baltic states and other former republics, but
ths ultimate Baltic goal would be connections with Europe.
Alignment with Nordic countries has many attractive
features. Norden possesses a strong community of interests
and an inherent balancing mechanism which ensures that the
actions of one member do not unduly jeopardize the needs of
another. The group is economically and politically stable,
and it is increasingly committed to peace. What is especially
noteworthy, is that the group considers the Baltic states a
part of this regional identity. They have provided possibly
the greatest moral and physical support in recent years, and
have indicated their willingness to allow independent Baltic
states to join the ranks of the Nordic Council.
Such a Nordic arrangement (at least initially with an
economic, political, and cultural emphasis) should be
perceived as positive by all parties concerned with European
security. It would be a stabilizing and balancing (with
respect to Germany) influence, and would reduce the chances
of a power vacuum by locking the three Baltic states into a
peaceful position of its liking. This would contribute to
overall European stability. Historical precedent and current
reactions suggest that the major Western powers will never
102
perceive the Baltics as a keystone of their foreign policies,
and will always prefer to see a regional alliance or a common
European security arrangement. A Nordic alliance, augmented
by a military alignment or a guaranteed neutrality, could make
that a reality.
D. CLOSING COMMENTS
Europe is undergoing a fundamental restructuring, and this
naturally carries a potential for generating military
instability. While adding resolution of the Baltic Question
to this situation might contribute to that potential, it
should be viewed, nevertheless, as an opportunity rather than
a problem. As has been shown, the Baltic states' neighbors
are supportive, and alternative security arrangements
agreeable to all parties are available if diplomats--
particularly Soviet ones--are willing to be bold, imaginative
and decisive. This is a chance finally to end World War II,
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